JAM  201 


sec 


s 


SPEECH 


y 

REV.  SAMUEL  G.  WINCHESTER, 


IN    DEFENCE   OF   THE 


ACT  OF  THE  SYNOD  OF  PHILADELPHIA, 


IN   THE  CASE   OF   THE 


ASSEMBLY'S  SECOND  PRESBYTERY 


OF  PHILADELPHIA, 


Delivered  in  the  General  Assembly,  May,  1834 


PHILADELPHIA; 

WM.    S.    MARTIEN,    PRINTER,    GEORGE    STREET. 

1834. 


Philadelphia,  May  29,  1834. 

At  a  meeting  of  a  number  of  individuals,  members  of  the  Synod  of 
Philadelphia,  held  on  Thursday,  May  29th,  1834,  the  Rev.  James 
Magraw,  D.D.  was  appointed  Chairman,  and  Rev.  David  M'Kinney, 
was  appointed  Secretary.     On  motion  it  was 

Resolved^  That  Rev.  James  Magraw,  D.D.  and  Rev.  Jas.  C.  Wat- 
son, be  appointed  a  committee  to  wait  upon  the  Rev.  Samuel  G. 
Winchester,  and  request  of  him  a  copy  of  the  Speech  delivered  by 
him  before  the  General  Assembly  of  1834,  in  the  case  of  the  "  Ap- 
peal and  complaint  of  the  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,"  against 
the  Synod  of  Philadelphia,  for  the  purpose  of  publication  in  any  form 
which  may  be  deemed  most  expedient. 

JAMES,  MAGRAW,  Chairman. 

David  M'Kinney,  Secretary. 


In  compliance  with  the  above  request,  the  following  draft  of  the 
speech  alluded  to,  as  far  as  it  can  be  recollected,  (it  having  been  de- 
livered extemporaneously)  is  submitted  to  those  interested  in  the 
subject. 

S.  G.WINCHESTER. 


SPEECH. 


Moderator, — Before  entering  fully  into  the  merits  of  this  case, 
permit  me  to  notice  a  remark  made  by  the  last  speaker,  in  relation  to 
the  act  of  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  by  which,  but  one  ministe- 
rial and  one  lay  delegate  are  commissioned  to  this  Assembly.  It  was 
said  that  by  the  act  of  Synod  appealed  from,  that  Presbytery  was  en- 
titled to  a  larger  delegation  on  this  floor,  but  by  sending  up  their  pre- 
sent number,  that  Presbytery  has  declared  its  own  belief  in  the  uncon- 
stitutionality of  the  Synodical  act.  But,  Sir,  by  a  reference  to  the 
minute  of  Presbytery  appended  to  the  commission  of  their  delegates,  it 
will  appear  that  the  right  to  an  increased  number,  is  expressly  claimed, 
but  the  exercise  of  it  waived  from  motives  of  prudence  and  peace. 

The  Presbytery  were  unwilling  that  so  grave  and  important  a  subject 
as  that  now  before  you,  should  be  decided  on  a  prelimmary  question. 

Sir,  had  the  Presbytery  insisted  on  the  exercise  of  their  right,  this 
weighty  subject,  with  all  its  difficulties,  would  have  met  you  on  the 
threshhold  ;  and  your  proceedings  would  have  commenced  in  the 
midst  of  agitation  and  excitement.  It  was  with  a  view  to  peace  and 
order.  Sir,  that  the  Presbytery  adopted  the  course  which  is  now  at- 
tempted to  be  construed  to  its  disadvantage. 

The  question  before  the  court  is  brought  up  by  appeal  and  complaint. 

To  the  jurisdiction  of  this  court  over  the  subject,  in  its  present  form, 
and  as  thus  brought  up,  I  enter  a  solemn  plea.  Not  that  I  would  now 
have  the  question  decided  on  this  issue,  but  as  the  merits  of  the  case 
have  been  gone  into  at  large  by  the  complainants,  I  would  urge  this 
plea  as  an  argument  for  dismissing  the  appeal  and  complaint.  The 
act  of  Synod  complained  of,  consists  of  three  parts.  1 .  The  reception 
of  the  so  called  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  as  a  constituent 
member  of  Synod,  agreeably  to  the  order  of  the  Assembly  of  1832,  by 
which  that  Presbytery  is  attached  to  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia.  2. 
The  Union  of  that  Presbytery  with  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  in 
virtue  of  the  power  of  Synods  to  unite  and  divide  Presbyteries.  3. 
The  division  of  the  Presbytery  thus  constituted  by  the  union,  in  vir- 
tue of  the  same  Synodical  prerogative.  The  act  of  Synod,  though 
consisting  of  these  three  distincts  parts,  is  nevertheless  one,  and  is  so 
regarded  in  the  appeal  and  complaint.  Against  such  an  act  no  ap- 
peal nor  complaint  can  constitutionally  lie.  Our  ecclesiastical  judi- 
catories are  of  a  complex  character,  like  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 
At  one  time,  and  for  specified  purposes,  they  are  legislative  bodies  ; 
at  other  times,  and  for  other  purposes,  they  are  judicial  bodies.  This 
distinction  is  recognised  throughout  the  Constitution  of  our  Church. 
And  nowhere  does  that  Constitution  sanction  the  interference  of  one 
character  with  the  other.  On  the  contrary,  when  a  judicatory  is  about 
2 


to  iransRCt  judicial  business,  there  is  a  transition  of  the  body  from  its 
legislative  to  its  judicial  character;  of  this  transition  the  Moderator  is 
required  to  give  due  notice,  and  to  enjoin  on  the  members  to  recol- 
lect and  regard  their  high  character,  as  judges  of  a  court  of  Jesus 
Christ.  (See  "General  Rules  for  Judicatoru  s."  R.  39.)  Of  this 
transition  on  the  present  occasion,  you,  Sir,  have  more  than  once  noti- 
fied this  Court. 

We  contend  that  it  is  only  from  the  decisions  of  a  judicatory  sitting 
as  a  court,  for  Judicial  business,  that  appeals  and  complaints  can  con- 
stitutionally be  entertained  ;  and  that  from  the  acts  of  judicatories  in 
their  legislative  capacity,  no  appeal  nor  complaint  can  constitutionally 
lie. 

That  this  is  the  correct  interpretation  of  our  constitution  will  appear  if 
we  examine  the  nature  of  the  remedy  by  which  redress  is  sought  in  the 
present  instance.  You  have  before  you  an  appeal  and  complaint. 
1.  We  will  notice  first,  the  remedy  by  appeal.  It  may  be  proper  to  re- 
mark in  this  place  that  the  sections  on  appeals  and  complaints  come 
under  the  head  of  "  discipline,"  as  will  appear  by  a  reference  to  the 
book.  The  division,  union,  and  erection  of  Presbyteries  are  provid- 
ed for  under  the  head  of  "  Form  of  Governmenl.''''  Now  it  is  a  ques- 
tion for  your  consideration,  whether  a  judicatory  can  constitutionally 
resort  to  the  "  discipline"  of  the  church,  for  the  purpose  of  erecting, 
dividing  and  uniting  Presbyteries.  In  noticing  the  remedy  by  appeal, 
I  would  call  your  attention — First,  to  the  nature  of  appeals.  Secondly, 
to  the  privilege  of  appeals. 

1.  The  nature  of  appeals.  "  An  appeal  is  the  removal  of  a  cause 
already  decided,  from  an  inferior  to  a  superior  judicatory,  by  a  party  ag- 
grieved."— Book  of  Discipline,  Chap-  VII.  Sec.  III.,  §  I.  The  word 
"  cause"  is  here  used  technically,  and  therefore  is  ajudicial  matter,  and 
contemplates  a  judicial  issue.  Again,  §  IV.,  "  Appeals  may  be  either 
from  a  part  of  the  proceedings  of  a  judicatory,  or/rom  a  defective  sen- 
tence." A  sentence  is  that  from  which  appeals  are  to  be  taken.  This 
too  is  a  technical  word,  and  shows  that  the  proceedings  alluded  to  are 
judicial  proceedings.  Hence  the  first  step  in  conducting  the  appeal,  is 
to  read  the  sentence  appealed  from,  together  with  the  testimony  in  the 
case.  From  this  it  is  manifest  that  a.  judicial  sentence,  not  a  legis- 
lative act,  is  the  only  legitimate  matter  of  appeal.  This  will  more 
fully  appear  to  any  one  who  will  attentively  read  the  whole  of  the 
third  section  of  Chapter  VII.  It  speaks  of  "  a  party  aggrieved,"  "  a 
regular  trial,"  "  refusal  of  reasonable  indulgence  to  a  party  on  trial," 
"  hurrying  a  decision  before  the  testimony  is  fully  taken,"  "  declining 
to  receive  important  testimony,"  "  prejudice  in  the  case."  These 
are  stated  to  be  proper  grounds  of  appeal.  When  an  appeal  is  taken 
up,  the  records  of  the  inferior  judicatory  in  the  case,  "including  all 
the  testimony  and  reasons  of  their  decision,"  must  be  read.  This 
same  article  also  speaks  of  a  "judgment  pronounced,"  "remitting  the 
cause,"  "  a  new  trial,"  "  original  parties."  The  nature  of  the  sentence 
from  which  an  appeal  is  contemplated  by  this  article,  is  such  as 


lighter  sentence,  in  which  latter  case,  all  further  proceeding  in  the 
cause  is  stayed  by  an  appeal  till  it  be  finally  issued. 

2.  In  regard  to  the  privilege  of  appeals,  it  is  only  necessary  to  ob- 
serve that  it  belongs  only  to  an  original  party. 

"All  persons  who  have  submitted  to  a  regular  trial  in  an  inferior, 
may  appeal  to  a  higher  judicatory." — Chap.  VII.,  Sec.  III.  §  TI.  "  An 
appeal  shall  in  no  case  be  entered  except  by  one  of  the  original  par- 
ties:'—^ XVII. 

Now  the  questions  pertinently  arise  :  1.  Was  the  act  of  Synod 
appealed  from,  k  judicial  decision?  Was  the  Synod  constituted  as  a 
court  for  judicial  business?  Was  such  a  transition  from  its  legislative 
character  necessary  or  constitutional,  in  order  to  pass  the  act  appeal- 
ed from?  Was  the  reception  of  the  Second  Presbytery,  its  union 
with  the  First,  or  the  subsequent  division  of  the  Presbytery  of  Phila- 
delphia, a  judicial  sentence  pronounced  against  the  appellant  Presby- 
tery ?  2,  Was  the  Second  Presbytery  "  a  party  at  the  bar"  of  Synod? 
If  so,  where  is  the  proof  of  their  citation  and  arraignment,  in  the  re- 
cords  of  the  Synod  ?  What  were  the  charges  tabled  against  the  accused  ? 
What  was  the  testimony  on  which  the  Synod  grounded  their  decision? 
The  Judicial  Committee,  in  reporting  this  case  to  the  House,  have  ne- 
glected to  perform  a  very  material  duty,  if  this  be  indeed  judicial 
business.  They  have  not  reported  the  order  in  which  the  testimony 
shall  be  read :  and  the  court  itself  has  erred  in  not  adhering  to  the 
Book  which  requires  the  testimony  to  be  read.  (See  ch.  VII.  sec.  Ill  § 
VII.)  If  the  Second  Presbytery  were  the  one  party,  who  were  the 
other  at  the  bar  of  the  Synod?  If  the  Synod  itself  were  a  party,  how 
does  it  appear  that  one  of  the  parties  is  at  the  same  time  the  judge  in 
the  case  ?  Is  it  competent  to  a  Synod  to  sit  in  judgment  on  its  own 
case  ?  If  you  regard  the  Synod  as  a  party  in  this  case,  you  will 
have  some  difficulty  in  issuing  it  agreeably  to  the  rules  of  of  the  Book. 
In  the  ninth  paragraph  of  the  Section  on  Appeals,  a  distinction  is  made 
between  " original  parties"  and  the  "inferior  judicatory."  But  in 
this  case  the  distinction  is  lost  sight  of;  a  circumstance  which  the 
Book  never  contemplated.  Who  then  were  the  parties  before  the 
Synod?  There  were  no  parties  :  and  therefore  there  could  be  no  ap- 
peal. But  if  there  had  been  parties  before  the  Synod,  it  is  manifest 
that  the  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  could  not  have  been  one 
of  them.  The  Second  Presbytery  was  not  a  constituent  member  of 
the  Synod,  until  they  were  made  such  by  the  act  of  reception,  and 
therefore  could  not  have  been  a  party  to  any  proceeding,  had  previ- 
ous to  their  reception.  And  if  the  appeal  be  heard,  on  the  ground 
that  the  Second  Presbytery  was  a  member  of  Synod  before  such  act  of 
reception,  it  will  be  a  prejudgment  of  the  case.  For  if  that  Presby- 
tery were  a  member,  she  was  made  such  by  the  act  of  the  Assembly. 
This  the  Synod  have  denied,  and  here  is  the  real  question  on  which 
the  parties  are  at  issue.  But,  if  it  be  contended  that  the  Second  Pres- 
bytery was  made  a  component  part  of  Synod  by  the  act  of  Assembly 
of  1832,  I  wish  it  to  be  distinctly  kept  in  mind  by  this  court,  as  I 
shall  hereafter  advert  to  it  again.     Is  it  pretended,  that  being  received 


by  the  Synod  as  a  Presbytery,  they  were  competent  to  appeal  ?  We 
reply  that  their  existence  in  the  Synod  as  a  Presbytery,  was  only  mo- 
mentary ;  for  the  same  act  that  received  them,  amalgamated  them 
with  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  and  of  course  destroyed  their  se- 
parate Presbyterial  existence.  They  do  not  appeal  as  individual 
members  of  Synod,  for  such  they  undoubtedly  were,  after  the  act  of 
reception,  but  they  appeal  as  a  Presbytery.  Besides,  they  do  not  in 
fact  appeal  as  members  of  Synod,  made  such  by  the  act  of  Synod,  but 
as  such  by  the  act  of  the  Assembly.  Here  again  the  same  question, 
involving  the  merits  of  the  case,  occurs.  In  no  sense  therefore  can 
the  former  Second  Presbytery  be  considered  a  party  to  the  transaction 
from  which  they  have  appealed,  and  if  not  a  party,  they  can  not  appear 
before  this  court  as  appellants. 

I  would  farther  observe  in  relation  to  the  privilege  of  appeals,  that 
the  party  appealing  in  this  case,  has  no  constitutional  existence, 
and  cannot  therefore  be  recognised  by  this  court.  The  appellants 
come  before  you  not  as  individuals,  but  as  a  Presbytery.  We  contend 
that  the  appellants  as  a  Presbytery  had  no  existence  at  the  time  the 
appeal  was  taken,  and  were  therefore  incompetent  to  any  Presbyte- 
rial act.  That  Presbytery  was  amalgamated  with  the  Presbytery  of 
Philadelphia,  and  its  separate  existence  thereby  destroyed.  The 
only  argument  that  can  be  urged  even  with  speciousnes  against  this 
position,  are,  1.  That  the  former  Second  Presbytery  had,  at  the  time 
of  their  appeal,  no  official  notice  of  the  act  of  Synod ;  or,  2.  That 
the  act  of  the  Synod  amalgamating  them  with  the  Presbytery  of  Phi- 
ladelphia, was  null  and  void.  In  reply  to  the  first  of  these  arguments, 
we  observe — 1.  That  it  is  true,  no  notice  of  the  act,  signed  by  an  offi- 
cer of  the  Synod,  was  published  to  the  world.  Yet  two  members  of 
that  Presbytery,  a  minister  and  an  elder,  were  present  in  Synod  at 
the  time  the  act  passed  ;  and  the  elder  actually  took  his  seat  as  a 
member  of  Synod  in  virtue  of  the  act,  and  participated  in  its  subse- 
quent deliberations.  2.  If  no  official  notice  of  the  act  of  Synod  was 
ever  given,  how  could  that  Presbytery  make  that  act  the  ground  of 
Presbyterial  proceeding?  With  what'propriety  could  they  appeal  from 
a  decision  of  which  they  had  no  official  notice  1  If  the  plea  of  want 
of  notice  be  set  up,  it  can  be  rebutted  by  their  own  records.  And  if 
the  plea  be  sustained,  then  there  was  no  subject  of  appeal  properly 
and  officially  before  that  Presbytery.  The  very  argument  (namely, 
having  no  notice)  by  which  they  would  urge  their  right  to  appeal  as 
a  Presbytery,  does  at  the  same  time  prove  that  there  was  before  them 
no  subject  of  appeal.  This  [is  their  dilemma.  But  2dly.  Will  it  be 
contended]  that  the  act  of  Synod  was  null  and  void  ?  The  acts  of  an 
individual  or  of  an  association,  may  be  divided  into  those  that  are 
void,  and  those  that  are  voidable.  Those  acts  are  void  which  the  in- 
dividual or  association  is  incompetent  to  do.  Those  are  voidable, 
which  a  higher  authority,  having  jurisdiction  in  the  case,  may  regu- 
larly reverse  or  repeal.  Such  acts  being  voidable,  are  in  force  till 
reversed  or  repealed.  The  authority  of  the  Synod  in  the  case  at  bar, 
must  be  determined  by  a  reference  to  the  Constitution,  the  only  instru- 


ment  which  declares  and  defines  the  powers  of  judicatories ;  this 
point  I  shall  examine  presently.  If  the  Constitution  clearly  grants  to 
Synod  the  power  in  question,  their  acts  performed  in  the  exercise  of 
such  power,  cannot  be  void,  and  I  shall  show,  in  another  place,  are 
not  even  voidable  by  the  General  Assembly.  The  appellant  Presby- 
tery  admit  the  constitutionality  of  the  act  of  Synod.  Its  language  is, 
"  It  (the  Synod)  has  merely  adopted  a  constitutionalpretext  for  counter- 
acting the  repeatedly  expressed  judgment  of  the  Assembly."  Though 
it  be  a  pretext,tis  it  has  been  unadvisedly  called,  yet  it  is  constitutional. 
Again :  "  We  think  they  have  exercised  their  power  of  uniting 
Presbyteries  very  injudiciously."  See  Appeal  and  Complaint,  §  III. 
Their  power  in  this  matter  is  here  fully  admitted,  but  the  wisdom  of 
its  exercise,  in  the  present  case,  called  in  question.  The  injudicious 
exercise  of  power  does  not  render  void  the  acts  that  emanate  from 
that  power.  If  those  acts  be  unconstitutional,  they  are  void  and  not 
obligatory.  But  if  they  be  constitutional,  however  unwise,  injudi- 
cious, inexpedient,  or  oppressive  to  a  disaffected  party,  they  are  bind- 
ing, until  reversed  by  a  competent  authority.  I  repeat  it,  therefore, 
that  the  Assembly  cannot  declare  void  the  act  of  Synod,  unless  it  can 
be  made  to  appear  that  the  act  itself  is  unconstitutional,  and  that 
the  Synod  in  passing  it,  transcended  their  powers.  And  whether  the 
appellants  have  made  this^to  appear,  I  appeal  to  the  judgment  and  the 
candour  of  this  court,  and  of  all  thinking  men  who  are,  or  who  here- 
after shall  become  acquainted  with  the  merits  of  this  case.  But  if 
the  constitutionality  of  the  act  of  Synod  is  to  be  called  in  question, 
by  what  judicatory  is  it  to  be  done  ?  Will  the  former  Second  Pres- 
bytery sit  as  a  court  of  review  and  control,  over  the  acts  of  the  Synod, 
and,  ex  cathedra,  pronounce  upon  the  constitutionality  or  unconstitu- 
tionality of  its  proceedings?  Is  it  competent  to  a  Presbytery  thus  to 
decide  upon  the  acts  of  a  higher  judicatory  ?  What  did  we  hear  from 
the  same  Presbytery  when  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia  was  charged 
with  usurping  similar  authority,  and  judging  of  the  legality  of  the 
acts  of  the  Assembly  1  We  were  very  plainly  told  it  was  rebellion 
and  nullification,  thus  to  erect  the  Synod  into  a  reviewing  court, 
over  the  head  of  the  General  Assembly.  The  principle  of  subordi- 
nation, and  of  course,  the  duty  of  submisson,  is  the  same  in  both 
cases. 

But  we  are  told  that  by  the  appeal,  the  separate  Presby terial 
existence  of  the  appellants  is  continued,  and  still  remains  unaffected 
by  the  act  of  Synod  appealed  from.  But  we  have  seen  that  no  appeal 
can  lie  against  the  act  of  Synod,  it  being  a  legislative  act,  not  a  judicial 
decision.  And  that  the  appellant  Presbytery  was  in  no  sense  a  party  to 
the  transaction.  A  decision  of  these  preliminary  questions  will  be  a  de- 
cision of  the  whole  case.  If  any  judicatory,  or  member  of  it,  not  a 
party,  can,  by  an  appeal,  render  ineffectual  the  legislative  acts  of  a 
superior  judicatory,  then  there  is  an  end  of  all  efficient  legislation, 
an  end  of  all  efficient  administration  of  the  government  of  our 
church. 

To  contend  that  the  appeal  continues  the  existence  of  the  Second 


Presbytery,  is  taking  for  granted  the  right  of  appeal  in  this  case, 
which  is  disputed.  And  it  is  always  inconclusive  and  unfair,  to  argue 
from  matter  of  fact  to  matter  of  right.  If  this  were  a  judicial  case, 
admitting  of  appeal,  it  could  be  clearly  shown  from  the  15th  paragraph 
of  the  Section  on  Appeals,  that  this  is  one  of  those  cases  there  mention- 
ed, in  which  the  appeal  does  not  stay  proceedings.  It  is  there  said  that 
if  the  sentence  appealed  from,  be  suspension,  or  excommunication 
from  church  privileges,  or  deposition  from  office,  it  shall  be  consider- 
ed as  in  force,  until  the  appeal  shall  be  issued.  No  such  sentence 
could  have  been  pronounced  in  the  case  before  you,  because  it  was 
not  a  judicial  process.  But  we  may  reason  analogically.  Deposition 
from  office  is  the  destruction,  for  the  time  being,  of  the  ministerial 
character  of  the  person  deposed.  The  act  of  Synod  was  the  des- 
truction of  the  separate  Presbyterial  existence  of  the  appellants,  and 
was  a  legislative  deposition  of  that  Presbytery.  And,  Moderator,  if 
you  will  enfoice  this  legislative  act  under  the  operation  of  an  ap- 
peal, I  claim  for  it  so  much  of  that  operation  as  '■'■continues  it  in  force 
until  the  appeal  shall  be  finally  issued."  I  shall  insist  upon  an 
equal  distribution  of  the  advantages  of  the  appeal  to  both  parties. 
And  if  you  entertain  this  appeal,  you  must  also  regard  the  act  ap- 
pealed from  "  as  in  force  until  the  appeal  be  issued." 

In  concluding  what  I  have  to  say  on  the  remedy  by  appeal,  let  me 
call  the  attention  of  the  Court  to  the  decision  which  the  Book  autho- 
rises in  cases  of  appeals.  The  tenth  paragraph  of  the  Section  on  Ap- 
peals reads  thus — "  The  decision  may  be  either  to  confirm  or  reverse, 
in  whole,  or  in  part,  the  decision  of  the  inferior  judicatory  ;  or  to  re- 
mit the  cause,  for  the  purpose  of  amending  the  record,  should  it  ap- 
pear to  be  incorrect  or  defective  ;  or  for  a  new  trial.''''  Here  you  have 
the  only  kind  of  decision  which  the  Book  contemplates  in  the  case  of 
an  appeal.  You  are  indeed  asked  to  declare  the  act  of  Synod  null  and 
void.  But  this  you  cannot  do  in  issuing  an  appeal.  Not  a  line  in  the 
Constitution  authorises  you  to  make  such  a  decision  in  issuing  an  ap- 
peal. If  the  act  appealed  from,  be  unconstitutional,  it  cannot  be  ap- 
pealed from.  It  is  ipso  facto  null  and  void.  The  course  to  be  pur- 
sued in  such  a  case,  is  to  dismiss  the  appeal,  take  up  the  subject  in 
the  constitutional  way,  hereafter  to  be  pointed  out,  and  declare  the 
act  totally  void.  That  this  is  a  sound  construction  of  the  remedy  by 
appeal,  farther  appears  from  the  eleventh  paragraph  of  the  section  on 
appeals,  which  reads  thus,  "  If  an  appellant,  after  entering  his  appeal 
to  a  superior  judicatory, /aiZ  to  prosecute  it,  it  shall  be  considered  as 
abandoned,  and  the  sentence  appealed  from  shall  be  final.''''  The  lan- 
guage is  imperative,  "s/ja//  be  final.''''  The  General  Assembly  can 
not  alter  nor  reverse  it.  This  is  a  right  secured  to  inferior  judica- 
tories by  the  Constitution.  But,  Sir,  shall  the  delinquency  of  a  party  or 
his  voluntary  abandonment  of  an  appeal,  make  "final,''^  and  operative  an 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL  ACT  ?  For  example  :  suppose  the  act  of  Synod  in  this 
case  to  have  been  unconstitutional,  and  the  appellant  Presbytery 
had  abandoned  the  appeal,  would  that  act  of  Synod  have  been  final 
and  operative,  and  beyond  the  reach  of  this  Assembly  ?     If  this  is  a 


legitimate  subject  of  appeal,  it  would.  The  Book,  a  higher  authority 
than  this  Assembly,  has  explicitly  declared  that  it  would  be  ''finaV 
If  you  declare  the  act  of  Synod  to  be  void,  you  do  thereby  declare  that 
it  was  no  proper  subject  of  appeal.  You  cannot  therefore,  without  a 
gross  and  manifest  violation  of  the  Constitution,  entertain  the  appeal, 
and  at  the  same  time  declare  the  act  appealed  from,  to  be  null  and 
void. 

II.  I  come  now  in  the  second  place,  Moderator,  to  notice  the  com- 
plaint. As  no  appeal  in  this  case  can  lie  against  the  Synod,  so  nei- 
ther can  a  complaint,  especially  where  the  Presbytery  complaining, 
has  no  existence.  It  is  often  said  that  any  one  may  complain.  This 
may  be  true  where  the  subject  matter  admits  of  complaint.  What 
says  the  book?  "  Another  method  by  which  a  cause  which  has  been 
decided  by  an  inferior  judicatory,  maybe  carried  before  a  superior,  is 
by  complaint."  "  The  cases  in  which  complaint  is  proper  and  advi- 
sable, are  such  as  the  following,  viz.  The  judgment  of  an  inferior 
judicatory  may  be  favourable  to  the  only  party  who  has  been  placed 
at  their  bar;  or  the  judgment  in  question  may  do  no  wrong  to  any  in- 
dividual ;  or  the  party  who  is  aggrieved  by  it  may  decline  the  trouble 
of  conducting  an  appeal.  In  any  of  these  cases  no  appeal  is  to  be  ex- 
pected. And  yet  the  judgment  may  appear  to  some  of  the  members 
of  the  judicatory,  to  be  contrary  to  the  constitution  of  the  church,  inju- 
rious to  the  interests  of  religion,  and  calculated  to  degrade  the  char- 
acter of  those  who  have  pronounced  it.  In  this  case  the  minority 
have  not  only  a  right  to  record,  in  the  minutes  of  the  judicatory,  their 
dissent  from  this  judgment,  or  their  protest  against  it,  but  they  have 
also  a  right  to  complain  to  the  superior  judicatory."  (Chap.  VII., 
Sect.  IV.,  §111.) 

From  the  foregoing  it  appears — 1.  That  the  decision  of  which  com- 
plaint can  be  made,  is  the  decision  of  a  cause,  a  word  used  in  the 
book,  technically.  This  further  appears  from  the  expression  "  party 
who  has  been  placed  at  the  bar."  A  judicial  decision,  therefore,  is 
the  proper  subject  of  complaint.  2.  There  can  be  no  complaint  ad- 
missable,  except  in  such  cases  as  will  admit  of  appeal.  It  is  true,  the 
party  at  the  bar  will  not  appeal,  if  the  decision  be  in  his  favour,  and 
in  such  a  case  other  members  of  the  judicatory  may  complain ;  but 
this  arises  from  the  character  of  the  decision,  not  from  the  nature  of 
the  case.  The  nature  of  the  case  is  such  as  to  admit  of  appeal  if  the 
decision  be  against  the  party  at  the  bar,  and  therefore  let  the  decision 
be  as  it  may,  the  right  of  complaint  remains. 

It  may  appear  to  some  of  the  members  of  the  court,  that  although  no 
appeal  in  this  case  can  constitutionally  lie,  yet  a  complaint  may. 
This  impression  may  have  been  made  by  the  very  general  phraseolo- 
gy of  the  second  paragraph  of  the  section  on  complaints.  But  a  care- 
ful perusal  of  the  whole  section  will  remove  that  impression. 

We  should  not  detach  a  paragraph  from  its  context,  and  interpret 
it,  in  its  isolated  posture,  without  reference  to  the  connection  on 
which  it  depends.     We  do  not  thus  interpret  the  sacred  volume.   Nor 


10 

should  we  so  interpret  any  connected  treatise.     This  section  like  that 
on  appeals,  evidently  contcmplcLtes  judicial  process. 

It  also  speaks  of  "  a  judgment"  and  "  a  party  placed  at  the  bar." 
It  is  but  another  sort  of  judicial  process,  unattended  by  some  of  the 
difficulties  of  appeals.  It  is  "  another  method"  of  trying  "  a  cause." 
By  what  art  of  construction  or  interpretation,  these  articles  and  this 
language  can  be  made  to  refer  to  legislative  acts,  I  am  unable  to  dis- 
cover. 

In  speaking  of  the  remedy  by  appeal,  I  argued  first  from  the  nature, 
and  secondly  from  the  privilege  of  appeal.  Now  as  to  the  nature  of 
these  remedies,  it  is  the  same  in  both.  They  are  modes  o(  judicial 
process.  But  with  regard  to  the  privilege  of  prosecuting  them,  they 
differ.  The  remedy  by  complaint  consists  in  this  difference.  Only 
"  original  parties"  can  prosecute  an  appeal.  But  it  was  foreseen  that 
cases  might  arise  where  "  the  party  aggrieved  would  decline  the 
trouble  of  conducting  an  appeal,"  and  yet  the  sentence  be  oppressive 
and  unjust,  and  "  injurious  to  the  interests  of  religion."  What  was 
to  be  done  ?  Here  was  a  difficulty.  The  sentence  ought  not  to  remain 
in  force.  But  how  can  it  be  remedied '/  The  aggrieved  party  de- 
clines conducting  an  appeal.  No  others  can  do  it.  This  very  diffi- 
culty gave  rise  to  the  remedy  by  complaint,  as  the  section  itself  states. 
You  at  once  see,  that  the  difficulty  does  not  relate  at  all  to  the  nature  of 
the  case,  it  is  still  a  judicial  process  that  is  contemplated,  but  to  the 
privilege  of  conducting  the  remedy.  While  therefore  it  is  true  that 
any  person  may  complain,  yet  it  is  equally  true  that  a  complaint  can 
only  lie  when  an  appeal  might  lie,  it  the  party  aggrieved  choose  to 
prosecute  it.  Complaints  therefore,  though  they  may  be  prosecuted 
by  any  person,  yet  can  only  lie  against  a  judicial  decision.  The  same 
arguments  which  show  that  the  appeal  in  this  case  cannot  lie,  bear 
with  equal  force  upon  the  remedy  by  complaint. 

It  may  now  be  asked,  is  there  no  way  of  redressing  the  evil  com- 
plained of  by  the  Second  Presbytery  ?  Is  there  no  way  of  bringing 
up  this  question  constitutionally  before  the  Assembly?  I  answer, 
most  certainly.  And  it  is  a  wise  provision,  but  of  late  very  much 
overlooked  and  neglected.  In  our  Constitution  it  bears  the  name  of 
"  General  Review  and  Control.''''  (See  Chap.  VII.  Sec.  I.)  "  In  review- 
ing the  records  of  an  inferior  judicatory,  it  is  proper  to  examine, 
First,  whether  the  proceedings  have  been  constitutional  and  regular: 
Secondly,  whether  they  have  been  wise,  equitable,  and  for  the  edifica- 
tion of  the  church  :  Thirdly,  whether  they  have  been  correctly  record- 
ed." §  II.  "It  may  be  that,  in  the  course  of  review,  cases  of  irre- 
gular proceedings  may  be  found  so  disreputable  and  injurious,  as  to 
demand  the  interference  of  the  superior  judicatory.  In  cases  of  this 
kind,  the  inferior  judicatory  may  be  required  to  review  and  correct 
its  proceedings."  §  III.  "  No  judicial  decision,  however,  of  a  judica- 
tory shall  be  reversed,  unless  it  be  regularly  brought  up  by  appeal  or 
complaint."  §  IV.  Here  also  it  is  clearly  taught  that  appeals  and 
complaints  are  confined  to  judicial  matters.  These  modes  of  process 
were  provided  expressly  for  judicial  cases,  and  were  never  intended 


11 

to  be  otherwise  applied.  The  manner  in  which  irregular  or  uncon- 
Btitutional  legislative  pioceedings  are  corrected  as  follows  :  "When 
any  important  delinquency,  or  grossly  unconstitutional  proceedings 
appear  in  the  records  of  any  judicatory,  or  are  charged  against  them  by 
common  fam,e,  the  first  step  to  be  taken  by  the  judicatory  next  above, 
is  to  cite  the  judicatory  alleged  to  have  offended,  to  appear  at  a  spe- 
cified time  and  place,  and  to  show  what  it  has  done,  or  failed  to  do 
in  the  case  in  question ;  after  which  the  judicatory  thus  issuing  the 
citation,  shall  remit  the  whole  matter  to  the  delinquent  judicatory, 
with  a  direction  to  take  it  up  and  dispose  of  it  in  a  constitutional 
manner,  or  stay  all  further  proceedings  in  the  case,  as  circumstances 
may  require."  §  VI.  Here  then  is  the  only  constitutional  way  in 
which  the  proceedings  of  the  Philadelphia  Synod,  in  the  case  before 
you,  can  be  corrected  or  repealed.  Is  not  here  a  special  provision  for 
just  such  a  case  as  is  complained  of  by  the  former  Second  Presbytery 
of  Philadelphia?  Let  the  Synod  be  cited  before  the  Assembly,  and 
if  its  proceedings,  according  to  §  II.  be  "  unconstitutional,"  or  "  irre- 
gular," or  "unwise,"  or  "  unjust,"  or  "  not  for  the  edifiation  of  the 
church,"  let  it  be  censured,  or  directed  to  "  take  up  the  matter  and 
dispose  of  it  in  a  constitutional  manner."  In  this  way  should  the 
case  have  come  before  the  Assembly  in  1832.  And  it  will  be 
strange  indeed  if,  with  this  plain,  wise,  and  constitutional  method 
before  their  eyes,  the  Assembly  again  issue  this  subject  in  any 
other.  It  is  made  the  duty  of  Synods  "  to  take  effectual  care  that 
the  Presbyteries  observe  the  Constitution  of  the  Church."  Chap.  XI. 
§  IV.  A  similar  duty  devolves  upon  the  Assembly,  in  regard  to  the 
Synods.  These  bodies  are  not  to  wait  for  appeals  or  complaints 
against  the  unconstitutional  proceedings  of  the  inferior  judicatories. 
It  is  their  duty  to  see  that  such  proceedings  be  corrected,  and  that  tho 
Constitution  be  observed.  But  the  reason  why  the  method  by  appeal 
and  complaint  is  in  most  cases  preferred,  may  consist  in  the  wrongful 
advantage  which  the  complaining  party  derives  from  the  exclusion  of 
the  body  complained  of,  from  the  house,  and  of  course  from  a  vote. 
This  is  indeed  a  more  sure  method  of  gaining  a  point,  but  one  most 
unfavourable  to  justice,  and  to  the  rights  of  the  body  excluded. 

If  complaints  against  the  legislative  acts  of  our  judicatories  are  to 
be  listened  to,  where  will  they  end  ?  What  strife  and  contention  will 
thereby  be  engendered,  and  continued,  and  encouraged?  Besides,  if 
this  practice  is  to  continue,  and  be  sanctioned  by  the  highest  judica- 
tory, and  if  it  be  the  privilege  of  any  one,  to  complain  of  any  act, 
what  inferior  judicatory  will  decide  on  any  question,  when  they  know 
that  they  will  be  excluded  from  a  vote  on  the  same  question  in  a  high- 
er body?  Will  not  the  lower  judicatories  be  thereby  induced  to  "  re- 
fer"  every  question,  and  thus  retain  their  right  of  deliberating  and 
voting  in  the  higher  judicatory?  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  large 
Synod  of  New-York  should  decide  some  point,  or  adopt  some  measure 
of  vast  importance,  and  there  should  be  but  one  troublesome  member 
always  to  be  found  in  the  opposition.  By  sanctioning  the  principle 
contended  for  by  the  complainants  in  this  case,  you  put  it  into  the 
3 


12 

povVef  of  that  one  member  to  bring  the  whole  matter  before  the  Assem.* 
bly,  and  exclude  that  Synod  from  a  vote  on  its  decision.  This  is  a 
question  deeply  affecting  the  rights  of  inferior  judicatories,  seriously 
jeopardizing  their  efficiency,  and  loudly  claiming  their  solemn  con- 
sideration. The  Greneral  Assembly,  by  encouraging  and  countenan- 
cing this  unconstitutional  practice,  are  greatly  increasing  their  own 
business.  Soon  we  shall  hear  of  no  appeals  nor  complaints,  but  every 
question  will  be  referred.  The  lower  judicatories  will  decide  none, 
and  thus  become  both  useless  and  troublesome.  Nolowerjudicatory  will, 
by  deciding  a  question,  voluntarily  and  certainly  exclude  itself  from  a 
higher.  This  could  not  be  expected.  Such  is  the  consequence  of 
departing  from  the  Constitution,  to  "  carry  a  point."  Let  us  then  get 
back  to  the  old  land  marks,  and  walk  in  the  old  paths ;  and  let  our 
highest  judicatory  magnanimously  set  us  the  example. 

If,  Moderator,  it  should  appear  to  the  court,  from  the  argument  now 
urged,  that  this  case  is  Coram  non  judice,  not  properly  before  them, 
we  ask  that  it  may  be  dismissed.  But  as  we  do  not  propose  to  submit 
the  case  at  this  stage  of  the  argument,  I  will  proceed  to  an  examina- 
tion of  its  merits  more  in  detail,  and  I  trust  you  will  indulge  me  in 
two  preliminary  remarks.  First:  I  cannot  discover  the  object  which 
the  complainants  have  in  view,  in  raking  up  old  differences  of  rather 
local  interest  than  otherwise,  and  which  we  had  hoped  were  forever 
buried  and  forgotten.  Why  open  afresh  the  wounds  which  once  pro- 
fusely bled,  but  which  we  had  hoped  were  in  some  good  degree  heal- 
ed ?  Why  call  to  mind,  and  press  upon  the  attention  of  this  court, 
circumstances  of  distant  date,  but  calculated  to  awaken  prejudice  and 
angry  feeling,  so  unfavourable  to  the  impartial  investigation  of  this 
subject  ?  They  have  no  other  connection  with  the  question  before 
you,  than  that  which  prejudice  and  ancient  alienations  create  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  once  were,  or  now  are,  excited  by  them.  Is  all  this 
done  for  effect  ?  'i'he  second  remark  I  would  make  is,  that  the  com- 
plainants have  dwelt  chiefly  and  emphatically  on  the  power  of  the  As- 
sembly, in  regard  to  the  erection  of  new  Presbyteries.  This  point 
was  mainly  pressed,  as  if  it  were  the  material  one  before  you.  Why 
is  the  attention  of  the  court  thus  diverted  from  the  real  question,  and 
directed  with  anxious  and  pressing  importunity  to  one,  not  necessarily 
involved  in  the  question  before  you  ?  Is  it  because  here  they  can  shield 
themselves  under  the  decision  of  the  Assembly  of  1832  ?  Is  it  in  order 
to  draw  from  us  an  attack  upon  that  decision,  and  upon  the  Assembly 
that  made  it?  Is  it  in  order  to  change  the  real  ground  of  controversy, 
and  to  plant  themselves  upon  more  advantageous  ground  before  the 
Assembly,  than  the  matter  of  their  complaint  will  furnish?  If  they 
could  succeed  in  guiding  our  shafts,  and  directing  them  against  the 
Assembly,  instead  of  themselves,  they  well  know  that  it  would  be  one 
way  to  prejudice  our  cause  and  promote  their  own.  There  is  a  sort 
of  ecclesiastical  pride,  under  the  influence  of  which,  one  Assembly 
feels  itself  bound  to  support  the  acts  of  another.  To  this  pride,  the 
argument  on  the  power  of  the  Assembly  to  do  what  they  did  in  18S2, 
may  be  intended  to   appeal.     The    artifice    may  become    success- 


13 

ful,  and  the  influence  of  this  pride  may  be  felt  m  the  final  deci. 
sion.  But  I  trust  that  this  court  will  not  forget  nor  disregard  its 
high  character  and  solemn  responsibility  as  a  court  of  Jesus  Christ. 

I  had  not  intended  to  do  more  than  glance  at  the  power  of  the  Asp 
sembly  to  erect  new  Presbyteries,  but  I  am  disposed  to  follow  them 
in  the  course  which  they  have  seen  it  most  to  their  advantage  to  take 
in  the  argument,  not  neglecting  however  to  bestow  a  full  share  of  at- 
tention upon  the  true  question  before  the  court.  We  are  by  no 
means  unwilling  to  meet  the  complainants  on  that  argument,  although 
a  decision  on  that  question  in  1832,  may  secure  a  similar  one  at  this 
time.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  votes  are  not  arguments,  nor  ar^ 
they  answers  to  arguments. 

It  has  been  asserted  more  than  once,  that  the  Assembly  have  decid- 
ed this  question  again  and  again.  The  allusion  here  was  to  the  re- 
commendation in  1831 — to  the  act  of  1832,  erecting  the  Second 
Presbytery,  and  to  the  famous  compromise  in  1833.  I  attach  but  little 
importance  to  this  supposed  threefold  decision  of  the  Assembly  :  but 
as  others  may  regard  it  as  an  important  circumstance,  it  may  be  pro* 
per  to  observe,  that  I  have  learned  to  distinguish  between  recomm,en' 
dations  and  commarids.  To  recommend  an  act  is  one  thing,  to  do  the 
act  is  quite  another  thing.  As  to  the  compromise,  the  very  word  im- 
ports the  opposite  of  a  decision.  It  v^as  a  refusal  to  decide,  so  that 
the  act  of  1832  stands  alone. 

Doubtless,  the  principal  reason  why  the  debate  has  taken  this  course, 
namely,  on  the  power  of  the  Assembly  to  erect  new  presbyteries,  ia 
that  the  complainants  ask  you  to  continue  their  separate  Presbyterial 
existence,  and  also  to  continue  that  of  the  Synodical  Second  Presby- 
tery north  of  Market  street.  Now,  Sir,  the  power  contended  for  is 
necessary  in  order  to  do  this,  for  it  will  amount  to  the  erection  of  a 
new  Presbytery,  as  can  easily  be  shown.  It  will  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  same  act  which  erected  the  Presbytery  north  of  Market  street 
destroyed  the  Assembly's  Second  Presbytery.  If  you  declare  that  act 
of  Synod  void,  you  thereby  declare  that  no  such  Presbytery  as  the  Sy^ 
nodical  Second  was  ever  formed,  for  it  could  not  have  been  erected  by 
an  act  that  was  null  and  void.  To  continue  them  as  a  Presbytery 
therefore,  is  in  fact  to  erect  them  into  a  Presbytery,  which  requires 
the  very  power  now  claimed  for  you  by  the  complainants.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  you  decide  that  the  act  of  Synod  was  valid,  (and  you 
must  decide  between  these  two  alternatives)  you  thereby  declare  the 
Assembly's  Second  Presbytery  to  have  been  destroyed  by  its  amal* 
gamation  with  the  first.  And  if  you  nevertheless  continue  it  in 
existence,  it  must  be  by  re-erecting  it,  which  also  requires  the 
power  contended  for  by  the  complainants.  In  order  to  grant 
their  request,  therefore,  it  is  very  material  that  you  possess  and 
exercise  this  disputed  power.  The  complainants  feel  no  desire 
to  have  the  Synodical  Second  Presbytery  destroyed,  but  rather  re- 
joice with  them  in  their  happy  riddance  of  a  connection  in  which 
they  could  not  be  happy.  This,  Moderator,  is  the  indulgence  of  an  oy 


14 

grudge,  and  wholly  unsuited  to  the  gravity  of  a  public  document.  I 
exceedingly  regret  the  expression  of  such  feelings  by  the  complainants. 
1  am  aware  that  attempts  have  been  studiously  made  to  cast  odium  on 
the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  and  to  represent  us  as  a  den  of  wild 
beasts.  All  this  may  have  its  designed  effect  in  determining  the  final 
vote  in  this  and  other  cases,  where  that  Presbytery  is  deeply  interest- 
ed. But  I  could  not  rejoice  in  a  conquest  so  achieved.  The  argu- 
ment on  the  power  of  the  Assembly  to  erect  new  Presbyteries  within 
the  bounds  of  a  Synod,  has  two  parts.  The  first  relates  to  the 
powef  itself;  the  second  to  the  nature  or  description  of  Presby- 
teries to  be  erected.  In  entering  upon  the  examination  of  this  ques- 
tion I  shall  reveise  the  order,  and  take  up  the  second  branch 
of  the  argument  first.  1.  Admitting,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  the  Assembly  has  the  power  to  erect  new  Presbyteries,  does 
the  Constitution  of  our  Church  contemplate  or  recognise  a  Pres- 
bytery formed  upon  the  principle  of  "  elective  affinity,"  such  as  the 
complaining  Presbytery  before  you  ?  The  name  itself  implies  a  differ- 
ence of  doctrine.  It  does  not  need  a  chemist  to  tell  us  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase,  as  applied  to  eclesiastical  affairs.  It  can  refer  only 
to  doctrine,  ecclesiastical  polity,  or  personal  attachment.  The  com- 
plainants themselves  have  traced  all  our  difficulties  to  difference  in 
doctrine.  Dr.  Ely,  in  detailing  to  the  court  a  history  of  his  grievan- 
ces, clearly  established  this  point.  Mr.  Patterson  did  the  same,  and 
declared  that  the  Assembly  did  sit  in  judgment  upon  the  doctrines  of 
Mr.  Barnes'  Sermon,  but  neglected  to  inform  us  of  their  decision. 
Now  we  take  these  complainants  at  their  own  word.  I  have  always 
maintained  that  our  difficulties  arose  from,  and  are  perpetuated  by, 
disagreement  in  doctrine.  Here  then,  we  have  the  secret  spring 
which  first  put  in  motion,  and  which  continues  to  sustain,  the  odious 
principle  of  "elective  affinity."  These  differences  were  not  minor,  but 
so  great  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  those  who  differed,  to  live  and 
act  together  in  the  same  Presbytery.  Both  parties  however  professed 
adherence  to  the  public  standards.  But  those  who  opposed  their  se- 
paration, were  never  suspected  nor  charged  with  departures  from 
sound  doctrine.  A  separation  on  this  principle  was  refused  by 
the  Synod  now  arraigned  at  your  bar,  because,  in  their  judgment, 
it  was  an  obnoxious  and  ruinous  principle,  unknown  to  the  Book, 
and  repugnant  to  its  letter  and  spirit.  But  the  Assembly  granted  their 
request,  and  erected  a  Presbytery  on  the  avowed  ground  of  irreconcilable 
difference.  Both  parties,  however,  were  recognised  as  good  Presbyte- 
rians. Before  this  separation,  the  divisions  among  members,  were  com- 
paratively unknown  to  the  mass  of  the  people.  But  when  the  Assembly 
in  its  wisdom,  arrayed  the  parties  in  different  ecclesiastical  organiza- 
tions, the  one  over  against  the  other,  the  world  saw  and  wondered  at 
the  posture  in  which  we  stood.  The  people  accordingly  took  sides, 
and  wrangled  among  themselves.  The  professed  object  of  the  As- 
sembly and  of  those  who  sought  the  separation,  was  peace  and  order 
and  the  support  of  the  Constitution !     Thus  were  divisions  recognised , 


15 

sanctioned  and  perpetuated,  where  there  was  professed  unity  of  faith 
and  order!  "Union,  peace,  and  love,"  was  the  watchword,  while 
division,  distraction  and  alienation  were  the  things  accomplished  ! 
Thus  the  Assembly  declared  their  willingness  and  determination  to 
accommodate,  with  a  separate  organization,  all  those  who  so  far  differ- 
ed from  their  brethren,  as  to  render  a  separation  desirable.  They 
thus  held  out  inducements  to  any  disaffected  minority  to  seek  and 
promote  divisions  in  the  Church,  on  the  principle  of  elective  affinity. 
Is  this  the  Constitution  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  ?  "A  Presbytery 
consists  of  all  the  ministers,  and  one  ruling  elder  from  each  congrega- 
tion, within  a  certain  district.''  (Form  of  Gov.  ch.  X.  §  II.)  This  "  cer- 
tain district"  must  be  determined  by  geographical  lines.  The  "dis- 
trict" which  contains  an  affinity  Presbytery  is  so  "  uncertain^''  that  it 
is  impossible  ever  to  determine  it.  Its  lines  are  intangible  and  un- 
defineable,  and  exist  in  the  mutable  partialities  and  whims  of  its  mem- 
bers. It  may  extend  its  limits  within  the  boundaries  of  every  other 
Presbytery  in  the  Church.  It  may  cover  the  whole  earth,  and  yet  be 
a  distinct  and  separate  Presbytery.  It  may,  so  far  as  its  bounds  are 
concerned,  be  as  any  distinct  denomination,  running  into,  and  covering 
the  ground  of,  every  other  Presbytery,  and  be,  at  the  same  time,  but  an 
integral  part  of  the  Church  composed  of  those  Presbyteries.  It  is  im- 
pei'ium  in  imperio.  Suppose  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  two  additional  votes  in  the  Senate,  should  form  an 
elective  affinity  state,  composed  of  a  particular  party,  and  having  no  geo- 
graphical boundaries  nor  "local  habitation,"  what  relation  would  it 
bear  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  1  And  yet  it  would  be  no 
greater  anomaly  than  a  Presbytery  formed  on  the  same  principle. 
The  paragraph  above  quoted  declares  that  a  Presbytery  shall  "  consist 
o(all  the  ministers  &;c.  within  a  certain  district."  But  the  principle 
contended  for,  completely  destroys  this  portion  of  the  Book  ;  for  the 
Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  does  not,  according  to  the  decision  of  the 
Assembly  of  1832,  consist  oi  all,  but  of  a  portion  only  of  the  minis- 
ters &c.  within  its  district.  The  formation  of  such  a  Presbytery  is  a 
manifest  violation  of  the  Constitution.  If  we  must  have  divisions  on 
this  principle,  begin  with  the  General  Assembly,  not  with  Presbyte- 
ries, and  the  objection  will  be  removed.  The  continuance  of  such  a 
Presbytery,  is  a  standing  contrariety  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  our  Con- 
stitution. There  may  be  members  of  this  court,  who,  while  they 
would  sustain  this  Presbytery,  nevertheless  wish  to  be  considered  as 
opposed  to  the  principle  of  elective  affinity.  But  this  is  out  of  the 
question.  A  deliberate  vote  to  new-create  or  continue  such  a  Pres- 
bytery, can  never  consist  with  a  sincere  opposition  to  the  principle. 
If  it  were  a  (\\ies\\onoi  expediency  and  not  o^ constitutionality ,  it  might 
be  otherwise.  But  to  believe  in  the  unconstitutionality  and  ruinous 
tendency  of  such  a  principle,  and  yet  to  vote  for  its  application,  is  an 
obvious  contradiction,  a  clear  absurdity,  and  is  a  reflection  either  upon 
a  man's  common  sense,  or  his  common  honesty.  All  thinking  and 
unprejudiced  minds  will  so  regard  it.  You  cannot.  Moderator,  shift 
the  ground  of  controversy,  from  that  of  constitutionality  to  that  of  ex- 


16 

pediency.  You  cannot  bribe  nor  cheat  the  judgments  of  men.  All 
see  and  feel  it  to  be  a  question  of  constitutionality.  And  as  such, 
you  must  meet,  and  decide  it.  No  subterfuge  nor  sophistry  can  de- 
coy the  unbiassed  mind  into  the  belief,  that  this  is  a  matter  of  mere  ex- 
pediency, about  which  men  may  safely  differ.  No,  Moderator,  to  the 
question  of  constitutionality,  I  repeat  it,  you  must  come,  and  there 
stand  or  fall. 

2.  But  I  hasten  to  the  argument  on  the  power  of  the  Assembly  to 
erect  a  Presbytery  on  any  principle,  within  the  bounds  of  a  Synod. 
On  this  point  the  Constitution  is  extremely  plain  and  satisfactory  to  my 
mind. 

Tn  the  formation  of  that  Constitution,  the  Presbyteries  have  made  a 
wise  distribution  of  definite  powers  among  the  several  judicatories.  The 
Constitution  and  the  Assembly  are  creatures  of  the  Presbyteries,  who 
may,  by  a  competent  majority,  alter  or  abolish  them  at  pleasure.  The 
Presbyteries  are  the  source  of  constitutional  authority  and  power. 

The  Assembly  is  a  body  of  defined  and  delegated  powers,  subject 
to  restriction  or  enlargement  by  the  Presbyteries.  The  Presbyteries 
of  the  Assembly.  As  therefore  its  powers  are  defined  and  limited, 
may  interpret,  modify,  enlarge,  diminish,  or  entirely  destroy  the  powers 
it  cannot  go  beyond,  but  must  act  within  them.  The  powers  not  ex- 
pressly nor  impliedly  delegated  to,  are  not  possessed,  by  the  Assembly 
The  Assembly  is  the  recipient,  not  the  fountain  of  power.  It  is  an 
agent  with  created  trusts  and  acquired  prerogatives,  not  an  ultimate 
Lord  with  inherent  omnipotence.  To  Synods,  and  not  to  the  Assem- 
bly, have  the  Presbyteries  granted  the  power  in  question.  "  The  Synod 
has  power  to  erect  new  Presbyteries,  and  unite  or  divide  those  which 
were  before  erected."  Form  of  Gov.  Ch.  XI.  §  IV.  In  defining  the 
powers  of  the  Assembly  the  Book  says,  "  To  the  General  Assembly 
belongs  the  power  of  erecting  new  Synods,  when  it  may  be  judged 
necessary." 

Here  is  a  specific  delegation  of  power.  And  it  is  a  well  known  and 
acknowleged  rule,  that  the  delegation  of  powers  is  always  evidence 
against  the  possession  of  those  not  delegated.  The  specification  of 
powers  is  evidence  against  the  delegation  of  powers  not  specified. 
Apply  this  rule  to  the  case  before  you,  and  where  is  the  authority 
now  claimed,  vested  in  this  body?  Point  out  the  paragraph  giving 
to  this  body  the  power  now  contended  for. 

The  act  of  the  General  Assembly,  therefore,  erecting  the  affinity 
Presbytery  was  unconstitutional.  It  was  the  exercise  of  usurped 
power,  as  they  themselves  shall  testify.  The  argument  which  was 
urged  on  the  floor  of  the  Assembly,  against  the  right  of  that  body  to 
create  the  affinity  Presbytery,  was,  not  only  that  such  a  Presbytery 
was  unknown  to  our  Book,  but  that  no  power  to  divide  Presbyteries, 
had  ever  been  granted  to  the  Assembly,  or  was  specified  among  the 
powers  of  the  Assembly.  The  argument  was,  that  a  power  not  speci- 
fied among  those  of  the  Assembly,  but  distinctly  granted  to  the  Synod, 
did  not  belong  to  the  Assembly.  This  construction  of  the  Book  was 
overruled.     But  in  another  case>  involving  the  same  prmciple,  the 


17 

Assembly  adopted  this  very  construction,  as  the  foHowing  extract  from 
their  Minutes  will  show. 

The  Committee  to  whom  was  referred  Overture  No.  14,  viz  :  "  Is  a 
minister  of  the  Gospel  in  our  connexion,  ex  officio,  authorized  to  or- 
ganize churches  in  the  bounds  of  Presbyteries,  without  any  j)revious 
order  of  Presbytery,  directing  such  organization?"  made  a  report  re- 
commending the  following  resolution,  which  was  adopted  accordingly, 
viz. 

"  Resolved,  That  except  in  frontier  and  destitute  settlements, 
wherei,  by  Form  of  Governments  Chap.  xv.  Sect.  15.,  it  is  made  a  part 
of  the  business  of  evangelists  to  organize  churches;  and  except  in 
cases  where  it  is  exceedingly  inconvenient  to  make  application  to  a 
Presbytery,  for  which  provision  is  made  in  the  act  of  Assembly  of 
1831,  it  is  not  the  prerogative  of  a  minister  of  the  Gospel  to  organize 
churches  without  the  previous  action  of  some  Presbytery  directing  or 
permitting  it ;  since  in  Form  of  Government,  Chap.  X.  Sect.  8,  to 
form  neio  congregations,  is  envmerated  among  the  jmwers  of  the  Pres- 
bytery ;  and  since  in  Chap.  IV.  of  Bishops  or  Pastors,  no  mention  is 
made  of  any  such  poicer  being  lodged  in  the  hands  of  an  individual 
minister. — {Minutes  of  Gen.  Assem.for  1833,  page  496.) 

The  argument  urged  against  this  construction  is,  that  the  General 
Assembly,  being  the  supreme  judicatory,  is  invested  with  all  the 
powers  of  inferior  judicatories.  That  the  greater  includes  the  less. 
That  if  Presbyteries  or  Synods  have  such  and  such  prerogatives,  the 
General  Assembly,  being  superior  to  them,  a  fortiori,  has  the  same 
prerogatives  and  may  ordain,  install,  &c.,  at  pleasure. 

But  the  above  minute  of  the  Assembly  declares  that  those  powers 
which  are  not  enumerated  among  those  of  one  body,  but  are  enume- 
rated among  those  of  another,  are  not  possessed  by  the  one,  but  are 
possessed  by  the  other. 

The  contrary  is  a  strange  position  for  Presbyterians  to  maintain. 
The  powers  not  delegated,  nor  necessarily  implied  in  the  delegation 
of  other  powers,  are  retained  by  the  Presbyteries.  A  power,  to  name 
no  others,  thus  retained,  is  that  of  altering  or  amending  the  constitu- 
tion.  Surely  this  is  the  exercise  of  supreme  authority,  and  yet  the 
General  Assembly  have  no  such  authoiity,  but  are  required  to  send 
down  any  proposed  amendments  or  alterations  to  the  Presbyteries, 
and  if  the  requisite  number  agree  to  the  proposition,  it  becomes  a 
part  of  the  Constitution,  even  if  the  Assembly  are  of  a  different  mind. 
And  if  no  such  concurrence  be  returned  by  the  Presbyteries,  it  is  not 
in  the  power  of  the  General  Assembly  to  make  the  proposed  altera- 
tions. The  Presbyteries  may,  if  they  see  proper,  annihilate  the  Ge- 
neral Assembly,  with  all  its  boasted  and  assumed  powers.  It  is  de- 
pendant for  its  existence  on  the  will  of  the  Presbyteries.  This  is  the 
doctrine,  we  apprehend,  of  sound  Presbyterianism. 

Again,  the  admitted  right  of  Synods  to  unite  and  divide  Presbyte- 
ries, and  the  recent  exercise  of  such  authority  by  the  Synod  of  Phi- 
ladelphia, show  plainly  the  absurdity  of  the  Assembly's  assuming  such 
a  power. 


18 

Such  a  power,  if  it  belonged  to  the  General  Assembly,  would  be  ad- 
verse to,  and  destructive  of,  such  a  power  in  the'Synod  :  and  would 
present  the  ludicrous  spectacle  of  a  Synod,  in  the  exercise  of  undis- 
puted authority,  undoing  and  reversing,  virtually,  the  acts  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  performed  in  the  exercise  of  a  similar  power.  The 
General  Assembly  in  May  divides  a  Presbytery  into  two  or  more,  and 
the  Synod,  in  the  fall,  or  next  week,  if  in  Session,  unites  them  again  : 
and  yet  both  bodies  acted  constitutionally !  If  this  be  the  nature  of 
Presbyterian  government  and  discipline,  it  is  high  time  they  were 
both  thrown  to  the  moles  and  bats.  It  is  impossible  that  there  should 
be  such  conflicting  rights  in  the  two  bodies.  If  the  Assembly  have 
the  right  to  divide  Presbyteries,  it  does  not  belong  to  the  Synod  to 
unite  them.  And  if  the  Synod  have  such  a  right  as  is  admitted, 
then  the  Assembly  have  no  such  right,  which  we  believe  is 
the  truth.  It  is  a  reflection  upon  the  character  of  our  Consti- 
tution, and  upon  the  wisdom  and  good  sense  of  its  framers,  to  assert 
that  it  gives  to  inferior  judicatories  the  power  to  annul,  virtually,  the 
acts  of  a  superior.  A  General  Assembly  and  a  Synod,  alternately 
undoing  each  other's  acts  from  session  to  session,  and  both  claiming 
constitutional  authority,  is  child's  play,  a  mere  farce,  which  exposes 
our  Constitution  to  contempt,  and  our  church  to  derision  and  scorn. 

It  is  manifest  then  that  the  power  of  Synods  to  unite  and  divide 
Presbyteries  is  utterly  inconsistent  with,  and  subversive  of,  a  similar 
power  in  the  General  Assembly.  It  is  a  plain  principle,  that  any 
body,  civil  or  ecclesiastical,  has  the  right  to  exercise  its  constitution- 
al powers  over  the  legitimate  subjects  of  its  jurisdiction.  Such  an 
exercise,  in  particular  circumstances,  may  be  unwise  and  injudicious, 
but  that  such  a  right  exists,  cannot  be  questioned.  Right  and  ob- 
ligation are  correlative  terms.  Every  right  supposes  and  creates  a 
corresponding  obligation.  If  the  Synod  has  the  right  to  divide  and 
unite  Presbyteries,  there  is  an  obligation  resting  upon  the  General 
Assembly  to  respect  the  acts  of  a  Synod  performed  in  virtue  of  this 
right.  A  right,  without  the  privilege  of  exercising  it,  is  no  right. 
It  is  but  a  shadow,  without  the  substance.  There  can  be  no  right 
vested  in  any  one  body,  adverse  to  the  rights  of  another.  It  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms.  The  only  questions  then  that  seem  pertinent  to 
the  case  in  hand  are,  1.  Whether  the  Synod  have  the  power  and  right 
to  divide  and  unite  Presbyteries?  2.  Whether  such  aright  be  not 
inconsistent  with  a  similar  right  in  the  General  Assembly?  The  first 
question  admits  of  no  dispute,  as  the  book  clearly  settles  it.  On  the 
second  question,  let  it  be  remarked,  that  the  nature  of  this  power 
renders  it  inconsistent.  It  is  a  power  to  do  and  undo  the  same  thing, 
so  that  it  is  the  mutual  power  to  undo  each  other's  doings,  which  is 
utterly  inconsistent  with  the  subordinate  character  of  a  Synod.  If, 
then,  the  General  Assembly  have  the  power  in  question,  it  is  a  power 
to  abolish  virtually,  that  of  the  Synod,  or  so  to  restrict  its  exercise, 
as  to  render  it  no  longer  worth  contending  for.  But  let  it  not  be  for- 
gotten that  this  power  is  expressly  guaranteed  to  the  Synod  by  the 
Constitution;  and  to  abolish  or  restrict  it,  is  a  contravention  of  the 


19 

Constitution.  It  is  so  to  modify  the  grant  of  power  as  to  render  it  a 
nullity.  But  we  have  seen  that  no  modification  of  the  Constitution 
can  be  effected  by  the  General  Assembly.  To  do  this  is  the  exclu- 
sive prerogative  of  the  Presbyteries.  But  it  may  be  urged  that  this 
is  only  a  construction  of  the  Constitution,  not  a  modification.  True, 
but  it  is  such  a  construction  as  amounts  to  legislation.  It  is  legisla- 
tion eflccted  under  the  name  of  construction.  There  is  a  wide  differ- 
ence between  judicial  interpretation  and  judicial  legislation.  When 
a  civil  court  so  construes  a  statute,  as  to  extend  its  operation  to  ob- 
jects not  within  its  purview,  and  not  contemplated  in  its  enactment, 
it  is  called  judicial  legislation. 

Presbyteries  should  be  jealous  of  their  rights,  especially  when  a 
mode  of  construction  is  adopted  and  applied,  which  tends  to  deprive 
inferior  judicatories  of  all  power,  and  to  make  them  mere  cyphers. 
Inferior  judicatories  should  insist  upon  their  rights,  and  upon  a  main- 
tenance of  the  Constitution.  This  book  is  a  mutual  compact  between 
ministers  and  judicatories.  We  promise  subjection  to  one  another  in 
the  Lord.  This  Book  defines  the  method  in  which  that  subjection  is  to 
be  rendered.  To  exact  subjection  contrary  to  its  provisions,  is  tyranny 
and  oppresssion.  This  Book  is  a  mutual  bond  and  pledge  which  each 
has  given  to  the  other,  and  to  violate  its  provisions,  is  to  break  faith 
with  those  with  whom  you  have  covenanted.  It  is  an  invasion  of 
personal  ministerial  rights  and  privileges,  and  deserves  to  be  sternly 
rebuked  and  indignantly  repelled.  To  violate  this  pledge  is  to  ab- 
solve us  from  the  obligation  created  by  the  promise  of  subjection. 
The  Constitution  of  our  church  is  the  bond  of  its  union,  if  this  be  en- 
trenched upon,  mutual  confidence  is  destroyed,  and  that  which  pro- 
fesses to  unite  us,  becomes  itself  the  subject  of  protracted  and  angry 
discord.  It  is  therefore  with  the  utmost  caution  and  delicacy,  that 
new  and  questionable  constructions  of  the  Constitution  should  be  pres- 
sed upon  the  churches.  There  is  a  point  beyond  which  submission 
to  such  adjudications  becomes  acquiescence  in  the  guilt  of  misrule 
and  maladministration.  To  such  a  deprecated  crisis  we  fear  that  our 
church  is  hastening.  This  Assembly  may  indeed  regard  itself  the 
court  of  last  resort,  from  which  there  can  be  no  appeal  to  a  higher. 
But  this  circumstance  can  never  justify  a  false  construction  of  the 
Constitution,  nor  lessen  the  criminality  of  that  acquiescence,  which 
does  violence  to  conscience,  and  contravenes  primary  obligation.  I 
am  aware.  Moderator,  that  this  is  a  delicate  subject,  but  not  less  im- 
portant than  delicate  at  this  juncture  in  our  ecclesiastical  affairs. 

Besides  the  Presbyteries  who  may  ecclesiastically  settle  the  inter- 
pretation of  their  own  instrument,  the  Constitution,  there  is  another 
tribunal  to  which  an  appeal  may  be  forced,  by  the  recklessness  of 
party  spirit.  Let  us  beware  how  we  explain  away  the  rights  of  one 
another ;  let  us  take  warning  by  the  results  of  similar  invasions. 

The  supremacy  of  the  General  Assembly  is  relied  on  with  much 

confidence  as  an  argument  for  the  power  now  claimed.  It  is  argued  that, 

being  the  supreme  judicatory,  it  is  invested  with  all  the  powers  of 

inferior  judicatories.     If  the  Assembly,  and  not  the  Presbyteries, 

4 


20 

Were  the  source  of  power,  and  had  not  expressly  granted  it  away, 
there  might  be  some  plausibility  in  this  position.  But  this 
is  not  the  case.  It  is  a  body  of  limited  and  defined  authority. 
It  has  indeed  a  general  supervision  of  the  whole  church,  but 
that  supervision  must  be  exercised  agreeably  to  rule,  and  not  in  vio- 
lation of  express  provisions.  And  I  must  express  my  surprise  at  the 
confidence  with  which  the  complainants  have  relied  upon  the  very 
general  phraseology  employed  in  stating  the  radical  principles  of  Pres- 
byterianism,  in  a  note  to  Chap.  XII.  of  Form  of  Government.  Such 
reliance  seems  to  betray  confidence  in  their  cause,  when  tried  by  the 
express  and  defined  provisions  of  the  Book.  If  the  fact  that  the 
General  Assembly  is  the  supreme  court,  does,  per  se,  invest  it  with 
all  the  powers  of  the  inferior  judicatories,  then  any  restriction  of  the 
powers  of  the  Assembly,  by  the  Presbyteries  would  be  inconsistent 
with  such  supremacy.  Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  superi- 
ority of  the  General  Assembly,  was  the  principal  argument  relied  on 
by  the  Assembly  in  the  assumption  of  the  power  in  question. 
Then  it  is  not  competent  to  the  Presbyteries,  to  define  and  restrict 
the  powers  of  the  supreme  judicatory.  But  is  it  a  fact  that  the  Pres- 
byteries, in  their  act  of  creating  the  General  Assembly,  did  forever 
divest  themselves  of  the  right  to  modify  and  restrict  the  powers  of  the 
body  thus  created  ?  Did  the  act  of  the  Presbyteries  creating  the  su- 
preme court,  j9er  se,  invest  that  court  with  all  the  powers  of  the  infe« 
rior  judicatoiies?  Unquestionably  not.  For  example:  The  Presby- 
tery has  power  "  to  examine  and  license  candidates  for  the  holy  min- 
istry; to  ordain,  install,  remove,  and  judge  ministers."  Chap.  X. 
§  VIII.  Now,  does  the  supremacy  of  the  General  Assembly  invest 
it  with  these  powers?  Because  it  is  the  supreme  judicatory,  has  it 
therefore  the  powers  above  enumerated?  Can  the  General  Assembly 
come  into  a  Presbytery  and  remove  a  minister?  Can  it  arraign  and 
judge  a  minister?  What  minister  or  Presbytery  would  submit  to 
such  an  exercise  of  usurped  prerogative?  To  do  these  things,  I  con- 
tend, belongs  exclusively  to  Presbyteries.  The  matter  may  indeed 
be  brought  up  and  issued  in  the  Assembly  by  appeal  or  complaint, 
but  this  is  in  virtue  of  a  special  provision  to  thu,t  effect.  Again,  if 
the  mere  fact  of  supremacy  invests  the  Assembly  with  all  the  powers 
of  inferior  judicatories,  why  has  the  Book  gravely  and  particularly 
entered  into  a  specification  of  the  powers  of  the  Assembly?  The 
framers  of  the  Constitution  considered  such  a  specification  necessary, 
because,  unlike  the  modern  interpreters  of  the  Book,  they  did  not 
suppose  that  the  fact  of  supremacy,  per  se,  invested  the  Assembly 
with  all  the  powers  of  inferior  judicatories,  or  was  any  evidence  that 
such  powers  were  possessed.  The  specification  of  powers  is  evidence 
against  the  delegation  of  powers  not  specified.  The  fact,  then,  that 
the  General  Assembly  is  the  supreme  court,  can  have  no  weight  in 
the  present  controversy. 

The  analogy  which  is  supposed  by  some  to  exist  between  the 
government  of  our  church  and  that  of  the  United  States,  was  also 
relied  on  by  the  Assembly:  but  the  truth  is,  no  strict  analogy  does  exist, 


21 

and  as  far  as  it  does  exist,  it  is  destructive  to  the  claim  set  up  by  the 
Assembly  to  the  power  of  uniting  and  dividing  Presbyteries.  It  is 
admitted  that  Synods  have  this  power,  but  it  is  denied  that  they  have 
it  exclusively,  because  the  General  Assembly  is  the  supreme  judica- 
tory. The  Congress  of  the  United  States  is  the  supreme  Legislature 
of  this  country.  But  does  it  therefore  follow  that  the  inferior  Le- 
gislatures have  no  exclusive  and  peculiar  powers?  The  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court,  is  the  law  of 
the  whole  land,  and  all  legislatures  and  all  bodies  must  observe  it, 
and  none  have  the  power  to  contravene  it ;  but  does  it  therefore  fol- 
low that  no  bodies  have  exclusive  and  peculiar  prerogatives?  The 
power  of  dividing  counties  belongs  to  State  Legislatures.  Has  Con- 
gress a  similar  power?  If  the  Legislature  divide  one  county  into 
two,  can  Congress  unite  them  again?  No.  Then  the  power  of  the 
Legislature  in  this  matter  is  exclusive,  although  Congress  be  the 
Supreme  Legislature  of  the  nation.  This  is  a  power  which  has  never 
been  delegated  to  the  General  Government.  And  the  fact  of  its 
being  the  supreme  Legislature,  does  not  invest  it  with  it.  So 
much  then  for  the  analogy  of  the  two  governments. 

There  is  another  argument  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  act 
of  the  Assembly,  arising  from  the  regular  operation  of  complaints. 
It  will  be  recollected  that  this  matter  was  brought  before  the  Assem- 
bly by  a  complaint  against  the  decision  of  Synod  refusing  to  divide 
the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  and  by  a  petition  to  the  Assembly 
to  make  such  division.  The  Assembly  sustained  the  complaint;  and 
according  to  the  Book,  the  complainants,  with  their  petition,  were, 
by  the  act  of  Assembly  sustaining  their  complaint,  again  before  the 
Synod,  in  the  same  attitude  in  which  they  stood  before  the  decision 
of  Synod  was  made.  "If  the  complaint  appears  to  be  well  founded, 
it  may  have  the  effect,  not  only  of  drawing  down  censure  upon  those 
who  concurred  in  the  judgment  complained  of,  but  also  of  reversing 
that  judgment,  and  •placing  matters  in  the  same  situation  in  which 
they  were  before  judgment  was  pronounced.''''  See  Chap,  VII.  Sec. 
IV.,  V.  The  only  effect  of  a  complaint,  when  sustained,  is  to  cen- 
sure  the  body  complained  of,  or  to  reverse  their  judgment ;  not  to 
make  for  them  a  new  judgment,  but  to  place  matters  in  the  same  situ- 
ation in  which  they  were  before  the  judgment  was  pronounced. 
Censure  was  not  the  effect  of  this  complaint,  for  the  complaint  was 
sustained  expressly  without  casting  censure  on  the  Synod.  The 
effect  of  the  complaint  then  was  to  place  matters  in  their  former  si. 
tuation  before  the  Synod,  or  it  had  no  effect.  The  act  of  the  Assem- 
bly, then,  sustaining  the  complaint,  referred  the  whole  matter  to  the 
Synod,  and  immediately  afterwards  took  it  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Synod 
by  acting  on  the  petition.  Now  the  point  to  which  I  aim  in  this  ar- 
gument is  here.  Pending  the  complaint,  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia 
were  out  of  the  house.  This  was  right.  But  when  the  complaint 
was  issued  and  the  judgment  of  the  Synod  reversed,  and  matters 
placed  in  their  former  state  before  the  Synod,  were  they  constitution, 
ally  debarred  a  seat,  during  the  action  of  the  Assembly  on  the  peti. 


22 

tion?  This  is  the  vital  question.  That  the  petition  was  tacked  to 
the  complaint,  and  that  the  Assembly  acted  upon  them  simultaneously, 
I  am  aware  ;  but  was  this  course  authorized  by  a  single  paragraph  in 
the  Book  of  Discipline?  And  can  a  novel  expedient  wrest  from 
the  Synod  their  constitutional  rights?  I  might  reinforce  this 
argument  by  the  consideration  that  the  petition  on  which  the  Assem- 
bly acted  was  an  original  petition,  and  never  before  the  Synod. 
It  was  not  the  petition  which  the  Synod  rejected,  but  was  materially 
different.  Besides  two  who  had  deceased  before  the  meeting  of  the 
Assembly,  and  one  removed,  seven  other  names  are  omitted  in  the  pe- 
tition on  which  the  Assembly  acted  ;  thus  placing  the  Synod  before 
the  Assembly,  in  the  attitude  of  rejecting  a  petition  which  never  was 
before  them,  and  which  they  never  saw;  and  thus  too  exhibiting  the  As- 
sembly as  acting  in  the  confused  and  contradictory  character  of  a  court 
of  appeals  and  of  acourt  of  original  jurisdiction,  at  the  same  time.  It  was 
said,  and  urged  with  importunity,  that  the  principle  of  both  petitions 
was  the  same,  and  therefore  the  change  of  names  did  not  make  it  a  dif- 
ferent petition  ;  but  this  went  upon  the  assumption,  that  the  sole  ground 
on  which  the  Synod  rejected  the  petition,  was  the  principle  it  involved. 
This  was  not  the  case.  They  were  influenced  in  their  decision  by 
the  fact,  that  ministers,  churches  and  elders,  M'ere  included  in  the 
petition,  who  had  not  been  consulted,  and  who  were  known  to  be  hos- 
tile to  the  measure  ;  and  that,  if  the  petition  were  granted,  these  very 
ministers,  churches  and  elders  would  be  a  minority  in  a  Presbytery 
where  they  would  be  without  influence.  This  was  declared  by  a 
member  of  the  Synod,  on  the  floor  of  the  Assembly,  to  have  been  the 
reason  why  he  voted  against  the  petition  to  the  Synod.  But  now  a 
petition  comes  up  before  the  Assembly  with  the  whole  ground  of  this 
objection  removed,  and  yet  it  is  pressed  upon  the  Assembly  as  the 
very  same  petition  which  was  rejected  by  the  Synod — and  which  re- 
jection is  the  ground  of  complaint — and  thus  branded  as  it  was  with 
broad  absurdity  upon  its  very  face,  the  Assembly  sustained  the  com- 
plaint/ The  facts  on  which  I  ground  this  argument  are  admitted 
facts.  Now  if  the  petition  was  before  the  Assembly  under  the  com- 
plaint, then  the  efl'ect  of  the  complaint  was  not  (o  place  matters  be- 
fore the  Synod  in  their  original  situation,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
express  words  of  the  Book,  and  the  action  of  the  Assembly,  conse- 
quently, unconstitutional.  And  that  the  petition  was  considered  be- 
fore the  Assembly,  under  the  complaint,  was  repeatedly  urged  as  a 
reason  for  the  action  of  the  Assembly  ;  and  is  further  shown  by  the 
fact,  that  instead  of  placing  matters  before  the  Synod  in  their  origi- 
nal situation,  they  enjoined  it  upon  Synod  to  receive  the  Prcs])ytery 
thus  set  off":  thus,  not  only  reversing  the  judgment  of  the  Synod,  but 
making  a  new  judgment  for  them,  and  requiring  them  to  sanction  it, 
and  act  under  it,  which  is  also  contrary  to  the  express  words  of  the 
Book. 

But  if  the  petition  was  not  before  the  Assembly  under  the  com- 
plaint, on  what  ground  was  the  whole  Synod  deprived  of  a  vote  on 
the  question,  whether  or  not,  the  petition  should  be  granted  ?    Here 


23 

Is  the  dilemma.  Viewed  either  way,  it  is  unconstitutional.  Were  the 
two  questions  purposely  mixed  up  with  the  «?iew  to  bring  upon  the 
petition  the  operation  of  a  complaint,  excluding  the  Synod  from  a 
vote?  This  too,  was  a  violation  of  the  constitutional  rights  of  a  Synod. 
Look  at  the  measure  in  every  light  and  it  will  be  seen  to  be  wholly 
unconstitutional. 

We  come  now,  Moderator,  to  examine  the  cases  cited  by  Dr,  Ely, 
as  precedents,  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  erecting  Presbyteries 
within  the  bounds  of  a  Synod.  That  the  Assembly  may  erect  new 
Presbyteries  where  the  jurisdiction  of  no  Synod  extends,  we  have 
never  questioned.  That  the  Assembly  may  unite  Presbyteries  con- 
nected with  different  Synods,  is  also  admitted.  But  the  case  before 
you  is  wholly  a  different  one.  Here  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia  had 
undisputed  jurisdiction.  Upon  an  examination  of  the  cases  cited  by 
the  Doctor,  not  one  will  be  found  to  be  in  point.  The  decision  of  no 
one  of  them  involved  the  principle  now  questioned. 

The  first  case  adduced  was  the  division  of  the  Presbytery  of  Car- 
lisle, by  the  Assembly  of  1794.  In  this  case,  one  of  the  Presbyte- 
ries constituted  by  the  division,  took  in  part  of  the  Presbytery  of 
Redstone,  which  belonged  to  the  Synod  of  Virginia ;  whereas  the 
Presbytery  of  Carlisle  belonged  to  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia.  (See 
published  Extracts  from  Minutes  of  1794,  p.  18.;  also  of  1802,  p.  7.) 
Thus  it  will  be  perceived,  that  it  is  a  case  where  it  was  impossible 
for  either  Synod  to  act,  and  where  the  power  of  the  Assembly  is  ad- 
mitted. And  it  is  therefore  a  case  widely  different  from  that  now  be- 
fore you. 

The  next  case  was  the  division  of  the  Presbytery  of  Albany,  by 
the  Assembly  of  1802.  This  division  took  place  under  the  old  con- 
stitution, in  which  no  specific  power  to  divide  Presbyteries  was  dele- 
gated to  Synods.  In  the  year  1820,  certain  amendments  were  sent 
down  to  the  Presbyteries  for  their  adoption,  one  of  which  was  that 
of  giving  to  Synods  the  power  of  dividing,  uniting,  and  erecting  Pres- 
byteries. All  the  cases,  therefore,  of  a  prior  date  are  irrelevant  to 
the  present  question.  And,  indeed,  before  the  amendment  now  al- 
luded  to,  the  Assembly  seemed^to  question  its  own  power  in  the 
case,  for  a  part  of  the  report  on  the  division  of  the  Albany  Presby- 
tery, which  was  adopted  by  the  Assembly,  expressly  forbids  that  divi- 
sion ever  to  be  cited  as  a  precedent  in  any  future  Assembly,  as  the 
MS.  minutes  will  show.  This  prohibition  is  strangely  disregarded 
by  the  Doctor,  who  now  presses  it  on  this  court  as  a  precedent;  espe- 
cially, as  he  is  so  great  a  stickler  for  unqualified  submission,  and 
passive  obedience  to  the  acts  and  orders  of  the  Assembly. 

The  division  of  the  Presbytery  of  Oneida  in  1805,  next  cited  by 
the  Doctor,  also  took  place  under  the  old  Constitution  and  therefore 
is  not  a  case  in  point. 

The  next  case  was  the  constitution  of  the  Presbytery  of  Chenango, 
by  the  Assembly  of  1826.  This  Presbytery  was  composed,  when 
constituted,  of  members,  of  no  less  than  three  different  Synods,  viz : 
the  Synods  of  Geneva,  Albany,  and  New  Jersey.     (See  Minutes  for 


24 

1826,  pp.  21,  66,  68,  74,  76.)  This  was  also  a  case  where  the  Pres- 
byteries concerned,  were  attached  to  different  Synods,  and  therefore, 
not  a  case  in  point. 

Another  case  cited  by  the  Doctor,  was  the  erection  of  the  Presby- 
tery of  Detroit  by  the  Assembly  of  1827.  This  Presbytery  was 
made  to  consist  of  churches  from  two  different  Synods.  The 
churches  of  Farmington  and  Potinac,  belonged  to  the  Synod  of 
Geneva,  and  the  church  of  Detroit  belonged  to  the  Synod  of  the 
Western  Reserve.  This  also,  was  a  case  in  which  no  Synod  could 
act,  and  in  which  the  power  of  the  Assembly  is  not  doubted. 

The  last  case  mentioned  by  the  Doctor,  was  the  translation  of  a 
church  from  one  Presbytery  to  another,  by  the  Assembly  of  1827. 
Here  the  Doctor  contended,  that  if  the  Assembly  could  translate  a 
church  from  one  Presbytery  to  another,  much  rather  could  they  unite 
and  divide  Presbyteries.  But  the  Doctor  took  good  care  not  to  tell 
you  that  these  two  Presbyteries  belonged  to  different  Synods.  Look 
at  the  Minute,  p.  114.  "The  Committee  of  Overtures  also  re- 
ported an  application  from  the  church  of  Danville,  in  the  Presbytery 
of  Bath,  in  the  Synod  of  Geneva,  to  be  set  off  from  said  Presby- 
tery, and  annexed  to  the  Presbytery  of  Ontario,  in  the  Synod  of 
Genbssee.  The  above  application  was  granted."  Why  did  not  the 
Doctor  read  this  minute  to  the  court?  Did  he  wish  to  deceive 
them  ?  Did  he  not  know  it  was  a  case  not  in  point  ?  Are  such 
means  to  be  used  to  gull  this  Assembly  ?  Does  a  good  cause  need 
such  expedients  to  sustain  it? 

In  connection  with  the  foregoing  cases,  where  no  one  Synod  had 
jurisdiction,  and  where  the  Assembly,  therefore,  was  alone  compe- 
tent to  act,  let  us  look  at  a  case,  not  cited  by  the  complainants, 
where  a  Synod  had  full  power  to  grant  the  petition  preferred  to  the 
Assembly.  The  case  as  briefly  reported  in  the  digest,  is  as  follows : 
"  The  Committee  of  Over tur^  laid  before  the  Assembly  (of  1808) 
an  application  from  the  Presbytery  of  Huntingdon,  for  a  division  of 
that  Presbytery.  Resolved,  That  the  Presbytery  make  their  applica- 
tion to  the  Synod  (of  Philadelphia)  to  which  they  belong,  being  the 
most  proper  judicature  to  decide  the  case."  (See  Digest,  p.  44.)  In 
the  foregoing  cases  we  see  that  the  Assembly  acted  where  the  Synod 
could  not,  and  that  it  refused  to  act  where  the  Synod  might ;  thus 
clearly  settling  the  question,  agreeably  to  the  construction  for  which 
we  contend. 

Thus  it  appears  that  every  case,  as  cited  by  Dr.  Ely,  contradicts 
the  argument  he  has  based  upon  them,  and  confirms  Ihat  which  they 
were  designed  to  destroy.  I  will  not  say  that  the  Doctor  knew  these 
cases  were  not  in  point.  I  do  not  impeach  his  veracity.  He  has 
entirely  mistaken  the  real  point  before  the  court,  and  therefore  did 
not  see  the  material  discrepancy  between  his  supposed  precedents, 
and  the  case  at  bar. 

Moderator,  I  have  thus  attempted  to  follow  the  complainants  in 
the  argument  on  the  power  of  the  Assembly  to  erect  new  Presbyte- 
ries within  the  bounds  of  a  Synod,  although,  as  I  before  remarked, 


25 

this  is  not  the  question  now  before  the  court.  Admitting,  for  the  sake 
of  argument,  that  the  Assembly  have  this  power,  in  what  possible  way 
does  it  affect  this  case?  You  are  not  now  asked  to  decide  whether 
the  Assembly  may  unite  and  divide  Presbyteries,  but  whether  Synod 
may  not  perform  these  acts.  It  is  strictly  a  question  as  to  the  power 
of  Synod :  and  ought  not  to  have  been  embarrassed  by  extraneous 
difficulties,  nor  by  irrelevant  discussion.  And  this  question  has  not 
been  even  touched  except  by  one  of  the  complainants,  and  by  him, 
only  touched.  A  stianger,  ignorant  of  the  real  point  in  debate, 
never  could  have  conjectured  from  the  argument  of  the  complainants, 
that  the  question  before  you  was,  had  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia 
the  right  to  do  the  thing  now  complained  of  by  the  Second  Presby- 
tery. Were  the  complainants  afraid  to  grapple  with  this  question, 
or  was  it  designedly  passed  over,  without  even  a  respectful  notice,  in 
order  that  their  arguments  may  be  reserved  for  their  reply,  to  which, 
according  to  your  adopted  order,  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  rejoin? 

But  let  us  hasten  to  the  consideration  of  the  Synodical  act  itself. 
And  in  relation  to  it  there  are  two  points.  1.  The  expediency  of  it. 
2.  The  constitutionality  of  it. 

1.  As  to  its  expediency,  that  is  a  question  which  the  Book  refers 
to  the  wisdom  and  discretion  of  the  Synod  itself.  2.  As  to  the 
right  of  Synod  to  do  the  act  complained  of,  there  are  two  questions 
to  be  considered. 

1.  Does  the  Constitution  give  to  Synod  the  power  in  question? 

2.  Can  the  Synod  constitutionally  exercise  this  power  in  opposition 
to  the  judgment  of  the  General  Assembly  clearly  and  previously  ex- 
pressed ? 

j.  On  the  first  point  we  shall  cite  the  Constitution,  as  suffi- 
ciently explicit  and  satisfactory.  "  The  Synod  has  power  to  receive 
and  issue  all  appeals,  &c.  &c.;  to  erect  new  Presbyteries,  and 
unite  or  divide  those  which  were  before  erected ;  generally  to  take 
such  order  with  respect  to  Presbyteries,  sessions,  and  people  under 
their  care,  as  may  be  in  conformity  with  the  word  of  God,  and  the 
established  rules,  and  which  tend  to  promote  the  edification  of  the 
church."  See  Form  of  Government,  Chap.  XI.  §  IV.  Here  we 
conceive  the  power  under  consideration  to  be  expressly  granted  to 
the  Synod. 

2.  On  the  second  point,  let  it  be  observed  that  the  power 
thus  granted  is  not  restricted  by  any  subsequent  provisions,  but 
extends  to  the  union  and  division  of  Presbyteries  "  which  were 
before  erected,"  whether  by  the  General  Assembly  or  any  other  body 
claiming  a  similar  authority.  In  order  to  make  the  Book  speak  the 
language  of  the  complainants,  it  should  have  been  added  immediately 
after  the  words  "  before  erected,"  except  where  either  or  both  of  the 
Presbyteries  have  been  erected  by  the  General  Assembly,  or  except 
where  that  body  has  expressed  a  contrary  judgment.  But  the  framers 
of  the  Book  never  dreamed  of  that  legislating  construction  which  is 
now  advocated  and  applied.  In  giving  to  the  Synod  the  power  of 
uniting,  they  never  supposed  that  the  Assembly  possessed  the  power 


26 

of  dividing,  or  that  their  judgment  could  obstruct  the  exercise  of 
constitutional  power  by  the  Synod. 

That  the  Synod  cannot  exercise  this  power  in  opposition  to  the 
judgment  of  the  Assembly,  is  a  mere  inference.  If  not,  point  out 
the  passage  where  the  restriction  of  power  is  expressed.  But  be  it 
remembered  that  the  delegation  of  power  to  the  Synod  is  explicit 
and  undeniable.  Now,  it  is  a  plain  principle,  that  no  inference  or 
implication,  unless  it  be  necessary  and  inevitable,  can  possibly  affect 
the  clearly  ascertained  rights  of  an  individual  or  a  body.  An  ex- 
press grant  of  power  is  never  to  be  restricted  by  a  mere  inference. 
Again,  the  delegation  of  this  power  to  the  Synod  was  not  by  the  As- 
sembly, but  by  the  Presbyteries  in  their  adoption  of  the  Constitution. 
And  can  the  General  Assembly  restrict  a  power  which  they  never 
granted  ?  The  General  Assembly  have  no  authority  to  grant  to  the 
Synod  such  a  power  as  is  now  in  question,  supposing  the  Synod  did 
not  already  possess  it.  And  can  the  General  Assembly  restrict  or 
modify  a  power  which  they  are  not  competent  to  grant?  If  the 
General  Assembly  by  the  previous  expression  of  their  judgment  in  a 
case,  may  debar  the  Synod  from  the  exercise  of  a  constitutional 
power,  then  the  Assembly  may  virtually  set  aside  so  much  of  the 
Constitution  as  guarantees  that  power  to  the  Synod.  This  is  con- 
solidation with  a  vengeance ! 

The  doctrine,  then,  which  we  oppose,  is  this — that  the  General  As- 
sembly,  in  the  enumeration  of  whose  powers  that  of  uniting  and 
dividing  Presbyteries  is  not  even  hinted  at,  may  nevertheless  at  plea- 
sure exercise  it,  without  the  possibility  of  being  debarred,  even  by 
the  previously  expressed  judgment  of  a  higher  judicatory ;  while  the 
Synod,  to  whom  this  power  in  so  many  words  is  expressly  granted, 
cannot  exercise  it,  if  the  Assembly  forbid  it  by  a  previous  judgment. 
And  all  this,  be  it  remembered,  is  bare  and  bald  inference. 

The  Constitution  says  to  the  Synod,  you  may  divide  and  unite 
Presbyteries  before  erected.  The  Assembly  says,  you  shall  not. 
The  Constitution  gives  the  power,  and  the  Assembly  forbids  its  exer- 
cise. Here  then  then  is  a  Controversy  between  the  Constitution  and 
the  Assembly — between  the  instrument  creating,  and  the  body  created. 
The  Book  declares  that  the  Assembly  have  no  power  to  alter  or 
amend  the  Constitution,  but  it  is  inferred,  that  the  Assembly  may, 
in  a  given  instance,  set  aside  the  Constitution,  and  overrule  its  ex- 
press provisions. 

The  only  question  then  that  it  seems  necessary  to  settle  on  this 
point  is,  whether  or  not  the  Synod  have  the  right  in  question  :  if 
they  have,  it  is  plain  that  no  other  authority,  inferior  to  that  which 
granted  it,  (viz :  the  Constitution)  can  possibly  destroy  or  abridge  it. 
The  contrary  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

It  is  indeed  asserted  in  so  many  words,  that  because  the  Assembly  di- 
vided the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  therefore  the  Synod  can  never 
unite  them  again.  This  i«  going  a  step  farther  still.  It  is  contending  not 
only  that  the  Assembly  has  the  power  of  dividing  the  Presbytery,  but 
that  the  Synod  have  no  right  ever  to  unite  them  again.     "When  a 


27 

Synod  divides  a  Presbytery,  and  whose  right  to  do  so  is  not  ques- 
tioned, that  Synod  may  unite  them  again  when  it  sees  proper ;  but 
when  the  Assembly  divides  a  Presbytery,  whose  right  is  not  only 
questioned,  but  denied,  the  Synod  can  never  unite  them  !  From 
this  construction  it  would  seem  that  the  wrongfulness  of  the  act, 
makes  it  iireversible  !  We  had  thought  it  quite  sufficient  for  the 
Assembly  to  claim  the  power  of  uniting  and  dividing  Presbyteries, 
but  that  it  should  push  its  claim  so  far  as  to  deprive  the  Synod  of  a 
similar  power,  when  clearly  and  undeniably  granted  to  it  by  the  Con- 
stitution, is  preposterous.  Are  the  acts  of  the  Assembly  like  the 
laws  of  the  Medes  and  Persians?  Is  the  affinity  Presbytery,  that  pet 
of  the  Assembly,  that  only  begotten  child,  that  offspring  of  unlawful 
love ;  is  that  Presbytery  an  independent,  and  immortal  body,  in  the 
bosom  of  the  Synod  ;  yet  beyond  its  control,  and  not  subject  to  its 
constitutional  jurisdiction?  I  ask.  Moderator,  can  the  Assembly  at- 
tach to  a  Synod,  and  is  a  Synod  bound  to  receive  a  Presbytery,  which 
it  may  not  control,  divide  or  destroy,  as  it  may  the  other  Presbyteries 
within  its  bounds?     What  an  anomaly  in  the  Presbyterian  church  ! 

But  it  is  contended  by  the  complainants,  that  the  act  of  Synod 
was  void,  either  because  of  want  of  power  in  the  Synod,  or  because 
of  the  informality  of  the  act.  For  you  will  notice  that  they  regard 
the  act  of  Synod  only  as  an  ^^ attempt"  to  do  the  thing  '■^designed." 
"The  Presbytery  thus  attempted  to  be  annihilated,"  &c.,  is  their  lan- 
guage. And  the  same  idea  is  studiously  held  up  throughout  the 
paper,  and  yet  they  have  made  this  mere  "  attempt"  and  "  design" 
the  subject  matter  of  a  grave  and  formal  appeal!  With  one  breath 
they  declare  the  act  of  Synod  to  be  void,  and  a  mere  "attempt,"  and 
with  the  next,  contradict  themselves,  by  acknowledging  that  there 
was  something  done  from  which  they  appeal,  and  of  which  they  com- 
plain. They  surely  do  not  mean  to  mock  and  sport  with  the  Assem- 
bly, by  complaining  of  an  act  that  was  not  done,  but  only  designed 
and  attempted.  Why  buckle  on  their  armour  and  march  forth  to 
fight  a  shadow.  Carrying  out  the  idea,  that  the  act  of  Synod  was 
void,  and  therefore  could  not  affect  their  Presbjterial  existence,  they 
continued  to  perform  Presbyterial  acts.  But  was  the  act  of  Synod 
void?  That  the  Synod  had  the  requisite  power  to  act,  we  have  al- 
ready shown.  Does  the  want  of  formal  accuracy  in  the  resolutions, 
even  admitting  its  existence,  counteract  or  destroy  their  efficient 
operation  ? 

The  complainants  themselves  have  answered  this  question  by  com- 
plaining. This  informality  vitiates  either  the  whole  or  a  part  only 
of  the  action  of  the  Synod.  If  the  whole,  then  there  is  no  ground 
of  complaint,  for  the  Synod  performed  no  act  in  the  case.  Their  at- 
tempt to  act  was  an  entire  failure.  To  complain  against  an  act  is  to 
acknowledge  its  existence  and  vitality.  For  a  complaint  seeks  a 
shield  against  its  operation.  If  this  informality  vitiates  a  part  only 
of  the  action  of  Synod,  it  must  be  that  only  which  attempted  a  divi- 
sion of  the  Presbytery  constituted  by  the  union  of  the  First  and 
Second  Presbyteries.     But  the  complaint  acknowledges  this  division 


28 

by  declaring,  that  "in  consequence  of  this  defect  (using  the  informal 
word  'divide')  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  must  be  held  not  yet 
to  exist  in  Presbyterial  order."  But  if  no  division  was  really  ef- 
fected, because  of  informality,  then  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia 
does  exist,  as  constituted  by  the  union  of  the  two.  The  informality 
of  the  instrument  might  be  said  to  render  doubtful  the  existence  of 
the  New  Second  Presbytery,  but  not  the  First.  Besides,  if  only  that 
part  of  the  action  of  Synod  which  contemplates  the  division  be  null 
and  void,  the  objection  we  are  considering  cannot  effect  the  union 
of  the  two  Presbyteries,  which  therefore  was  not  a  nullity.  The 
validity  of  the  union,  and  of  course  the  annihilation  of  the  former 
Second  Presbytery  by  that  union,  are  resolved  into  the  first  question 
as  to  the  power  of  Synod,  which  we  have  already  discussed.  And 
from  this  second  difficulty  which  respects  the  validity  of  the  division, 
the  complainants  can  derive  no  advantage. 

The  complainants  say,  "  The  united  Presbytery  of  the  foregoing 
minute  having  been  divided,  and  the  continued  existence  of  the  for- 
mer Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  not  having  been  declared,  some  time 
should  have  been  named  for  the  constitution  of  the  Presbytery  south 
of  Market  street;  and  in  consequence  of  this  defect,  the  Presbytery 
of  Philadelphia  must  be  held  not  yet  to  exist  in  Presbyterial  order." 
§VII. 

This  is  a  curious  specimen  of  Presbyterial  exposition.  It  is  a  com- 
ment on  the  act  of  Synod  to  this  effect.  The  Synod  of  Philadel- 
phia in  attempting  to  destroy  the  Presbyterial  existence  of  the 
former  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  though  this  was  their  de- 
clared object,  have  nevertheless  entirely  missed  the  mark,  and  unwit- 
tingly given  a  fatal  blow  to  the  old  Mother,  whom  the  Synod  designed 
to  cherish  and  continue  in  existence.  The  official  expression  of  the 
above  opinion  by  the  former  Second  Presbytery,  after  the  act  of  Sy- 
nod, is  a  declaration  of  their  own  continued  existence,  while  the 
opinion  thus  expressed  is,  that  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  "no 
longer  exists  in  Presbyterial  order."  The  intention  of  Synod  is  fully 
admitted  in  the  appeal  and  complaint.  The  appeal  professes  to  be 
against  what  the  Synod  attempted  and  designed  to  do.  They  appeal 
"  from  so  much  of  the  above  recited  decision  as  was  designed  to 
unite  the  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  with  the  Presbytery  of 
Philadelphia."  You  will  here  observe  a  singular  dilemma  in  which 
these  appealing  brethren  are  placed.  They  contend  that  either  from 
informality  or  want  of  power,  or  from  both,  the  act  of  Synod  was 
void ;  and  yet  that  it  was  effectual  in  destroying  the  existence  of  the 
Presbytery  of  Philadelphia.  If  the  act  of  Synod  was  void,  being 
a  mere  "  attempt"  and  "  design,"  with  what  propriety  could  they 
say  that  in  consequence  of  it,  "  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  must 
be  held  not  yet  to  exist  in  Presbyterial  order?" 

By  dividing  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia,  the  Synod  meant  to  set 
off  all  those  ministers  and  churches  north  of  Market  street,  and  to 
constitute  them  a  new  Presbytery.  And  that  the  first  Presbytery 
should  continue  to  exist,  with  the  addition  of  all  those  south  of  said 


29 

line,  who  belonged  to  the  former  Second  Presbytery.  Not  one  mem- 
ber in  Synod  doubted  for  a  moment  what  was  the  intention  of 
Synod.  No  one  even  suggested  the  difficulty  now  made.  Is  it  for 
a  moment  to  be  supposed,  that  the  Synod  would  deliberately  annihi- 
late the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  without  making  Presbyterial  pro- 
vision for  its  members?  And  is  it  to  be  supposed,  that  when  the 
Synod  added  members  to  that  Presbytery,  they  intended  by  that  act,  to 
destroy  its  existence  1  Preposterous !  Again,  the  fact  of  the  Sy- 
nod's taking  no  order  for  the  organization  of  the  Old  Presbytery,  suf- 
ficiently declares  their  meaning.  If  they  had  considered  that  Pres- 
bytery to  be  newly  created  by  their  act  of  division,  would  they  not 
have  taken  order  for  its  proper  organization,  as  they  did  for  the  or- 
ganization of  the  New  Second  Presbytery?  Construe  this  remedial 
act  liberally,  compare  one  part  of  it  with  another,  and  consult  the 
evident  intention  of  the  Synod,  and  that  must  be  a  strangely  pervert- 
ed mind,  which  can  still  regard  the  act  of  Synod  a  nullity,  in  whole, 
or  in  part,  because  of  informality. 

As  to  the  difficulty  which  some  profess  to  feel  in  regard  to  the  lo- 
cation of  some  of  the  members  of  the  Presbyteries,  it  is  only  neces- 
saiy  to  observe  that  they  have  a  residence  somewhere.  They  are  not 
without  t'  a  local  habitation  or  a  name."  The  line  dividing  the  two 
Presbyteries,  extends  "  as  far  as  necessary,"  that  is,  round  the  globe, 
if  it  be  "  necessary."  It  is  easily  ascertained  who  7'eside  north  and 
who  reside  south  of  said  line. 

But  if,  for  any  cause,  the  act  of  Synod  was  void,  and  if  this  As- 
sembly should  so  declare  it,  how  can  the  Second  Presbytery  appear  be- 
fore your  bar  as  a  party  with  an  appeal?  If  the  act  be  void,  then 
that  Presbytery  was  not  a  constituent  member  of  Synod,  or  if  it 
were,  it  was  made  so  by  the  act  of  Assembly  in  1832.  This  is  the  point 
I  some  time  since  promised  to  notice.  The  act  of  the  Assembly  is 
very  explicit :  "  JResoZrea,  that  said  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia 
is  hereby  declared  to  belong  to  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia,  and  is  at- 
tached to  the  same  as  an  integral  part  thereof."  Minutes  for  1832, 
p.  322.  From  this  it  appears  that  in  the  judgment  of  the  Assembly, 
that  Presbytery  was  in  fact  made  a  member  of  the  Synod  at  that  time, 
and  still  continues  such.  If  so,  it  has  been  in  the  Synod  for  two 
years.  But  the  complainants  have  told  you,  that  their  connexion  with 
the  Synod  was  only  momentary — that  the  same  act  which  received, 
amalgamated  them.  This  is  the  burden  of  their  complaint.  The 
Assembly  will  surely  adhere  to  its  own  minute  in  the  case.  For  it 
is  a  material  argument  with  the  complainants,  that  the  Assembly 
should  recognize  and  maintain  is  own  acts.  The  Assembly  must  re- 
gard that  Presbytery  as  having  been  really  connected  with  the  Synod 
from  the  date  of  its  own  minute.  If  so,  the  ground  of  complaint  has  no 
existence,  for  instead  of  being  in  the  Synod  but  for  a  moment,  they  have 
been  in  it  for  two  years.  And  pray.  Moderator,  how  long  must  a 
Presbytery  be  in  connexion  with  a  Synod  before  that  Synod  can  ex- 
ercise its  authority  in  dividing  it  ?  If  two  years  are  not  sufficient, 
how  many  are  ?     But  if  that  Presbytery  were  not  a  member  of  Synod 


30 

iiW  received  in  the  fall  of  1833,  by  the  act  now  complained  of,  hoWy 
I  ask  again,  can  they  appear  as  a  party  at  your  bar  with  an  appeal  1 
Besides,  if  they  were  not  in  connexion  with  the  Synod  till  1 833,  it  must 
be  in  consequence  of  the  refusal  of  the  Synod  to  receive  them  in  the 
fall  of  1832.  But  that  refusal  you  have  called  nullification,  and  have 
declared  void,  by  still  recognizing  them  on  your  minutes  as  in  con- 
nexion with  that  Synod.  How  do  these  things  hang  together?  I 
confess,  Moderator,  that  this  is  a  dilemma,  from  which  the  complain- 
ants cannot  be  easily  extricated. 

We  have  heard  much  of  nullification.  But  who,  in  the  case  before 
you,  are  the  nullifiers  ?  The  Synod  who  have  received  the  Second 
Presbytery  under  the  order  of  the  Assembly,  or  the  Second  Presbytery 
in  resisting  the  acknowledged  authority  of  the  Synod?  Must  the 
Constitution  of  the  Church  be  made  to  bend  to  the  will  and  wishes 
of  a  party,  and  that  party  a  minority  in  the  Synod  whose  act  is  thus 
resisted  ? 

The  acknowledged  constitutional  authority  of  the  Synod,  in  the 
present  instance,  has  been  openly,  avowedly,  and  perseveringly  re- 
sisted by  the  Second  Presbytery,  with  a  confident  reliance  upon  the 
countenance  and  support  of  this  Assembly.  Their  act  of  nullifica- 
tion, however,  is  attempted  to  be  shielded,  if  not  concealed,  by  an  ap- 
peal and  complaint.  By  this  appeal  and  complaint,  they  have  volun- 
tarily placed  the  matter  sub  judice  before  the  supreme  judica- 
tory, but  such  is  their  confident  hope  of  a  favourable  decision 
by  this  body,  that  they  ventured  to  act  upon  an  anticipated  de- 
cision. They  appealed  to  the  Assembly  and  then  proceeded  to 
decide  their  own  appeal,  by  continuing  to  act  as  if  the  Synod 
had  passed  no  order  on  the  subject.  Thus  taking  the  law  into 
their  own  hands,  they  have  both  presumed  upon,  and  anticipated  the 
judgment  of  the  Assembly  in  the  case  which  they  have  gravely  sub- 
mitted to  them.  Is  not  that  Presbytery  at  present  acting  just  as  if 
the  Assembly  had  decided  in  their  favour  ? 

It  is  saying — "  Gentlemen  of  the  Assembly  !  You  may  decide  this 
matter  as  you  please.  Your  previous  decisions  in  our  case,  have  com- 
mitted you  to  a  favourable  entertainment  of  our  appeal  at  this  time, 
and  we  are  therefore  determined  to  act  in  accordance  with  what,  in 
our  opinion,  your  decision  ought  to  be." 

The  former  Second  Presbytery,  since  their  dissolution  by  the  ac- 
knowledged constitutional  authority,  proceeded  to  ordain  and  install  a 
brother.  They  also  received  and  licensed  a  candidate,  who  had  been 
dismissed  from  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  to  a  Presbytery  in  Vir- 
ginia. They  have  taken  from  a  church  session,  over  whom  they  have 
no  jurisdiction,  and  against  their  consent,  the  control  of  their  own  va- 
cant pulpit,  thus  encroaching  upon  the  jurisdiction  and  violating  the 
rights  of  the  real  Second  Presbytery  north  of  Market  street,  and  also 
virtually  deposing  that  session  without  a  hearing  or  a  trial. 

But  a  few  hours  since,  and  while  the  matter  was  actually  under 
discussion  in  this  court,  they  met  and  performed  Fresbyterial  acts, 
just  as  if  their  existence  as  a  Presbytery  were  not  a  matter  of  grave 


31 

debate  in  the  highest  court.  And  what  is  more,  you  were  formally- 
invited  to  attend  and  witness  their  proceedings.  This,  Sir,  is  like  an 
infatuated  girl,  who  asks  her  father's  consent  to  a  proposed  matrimonial 
connection,  and  while  he  is  deliberating  on  the  matter,  and  making 
up  his  mind,  she  invites  him  to  witness  the  ceremony.  Sir,  it  is  as  if 
a  criminal  should  be  arraigned  at  the  bar  of  a  civil  court  on  the  charge 
of  murder,  and  while  the  jury  are  determining  on  a  proper  verdict  in 
the  case,  they  are  summoned  to  witness  his  execution.  Sir,  that 
Presbytery  have  submitted  to  you  the  serious  question,  whether  or  no 
they  have  any  existence  at  all  as  a  Presbytery,  and  before  receiving 
your  answer,  have  asked  you  to  witness  their  Presbyterial  acts! 
Delicacy,  Moderator,  if  not  a  respect  to  the  opinion  of  this  court, 
should  have  dictated  a  different  course,  and  have  induced  them  at 
least,  to  await  your  answer  with  dignity  and  decorum.  Sir,  I  must 
regard  such  proceedings,  either  as  a  too  confident  reliance  on  the  par- 
tialities of  this  Assembly,  and  a  too  bold  presumption  upon  your  party 
spirit,  or  as  a  practical  disregard  of  whatever  judgment  you  may  ren- 
der in  the  case. 

Although  these  acts  are  wholly  unconstitutional,  irregular,  oppres- 
sive, and  void  as  to  authority,  yet  you  must  not  be  surprised  if  they  be 
urged  before  this  court,  as  reasons  for  hearing  and  sustaining  the  ap- 
peal and  complaint.  It  will  perhaps,  be  said  with  great  earnestness — 
"  O  do  not  sanction  the  proceedings  of  Synod,  for  if  so,  in  what  a  pre- 
dicament will  you  place  some  good  brethren  and  churches?"  Thus, 
Sir,  the  very  gaping,  bleeding  wounds,  which  have  been  inflicted  upon 
our  suffering  and  trampled  Constitution  and  discipline,  will  be  urged 
as  reasons  for  not  applying  an  efficient  remedy,  and  raising  it  from  the 
dust  of  the  earth. 

But,  Sir,  it  is  hoped  that  the  rashnes  and  indiscretion  of  excit- 
ed brethren,  will  not  be  listened  to  by  this  court,  as  arguments  in  a 
question,  so  vitally  affecting  the  Constitution  and  character  of  our 
church. 

Moderator,  of  what  does  the  Second  Presbytery  complain  ?  Is  it 
of  ihe  whole  act  of  Synod,  or  of  a  part  only  ?  At  one  time  it  is  con- 
tended by  the  complainants  that  the  act  of  Synod  must  be  regarded 
as  but  one  act,  and  at  another  time,  that  it  must  be  regarded  as  a 
series  of  separate  acts.  If  the  act  be  treated  as  one,  then  their  re- 
ception is  a  matter  of  complaint.  They  have,  indeed,  specified  so 
much  of  the  act  as  unites  them  to  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia. 
But  if  this  were  perfectly  within  the  power  of  Synod,  it  cannot  be  the 
subject  matter  of  complaint,  unless  it  can  be  shown  to  have  been  a 
wrongful  exercise  of  power.  When  the  Assembly  attached  that  Pres- 
bytery to  the  Synod,  it  invested  the  Synod  with  the  constitutional  con- 
trol of  it.  Of  this  the  complainants  seem  to  have  been  aware,  when  they 
specify  as  the  ground  of  complaint,  that  as  a  Presbytery  they  were  not 
consulted.  On  this  point  I  observe,  first,  that  inasmuch  as  the  opin- 
ion and  feelings  of  that  Presbytery  on  this  subject  were  notorious, 
and  familiar  to  all,  it  would  have  been  a  mock  procedure,  a  mere 
sham  consultation,  had  they  been  previously  conferred  with,  in  rela- 


32 

tion  to  the  measure.  Besides,  was  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia 
consulted  when  they  were  divided  by  the  Assembly?  It  is  certainly 
proper  that  there  should  be  consultation,  in  ordinary  cases,  but  when 
by  their  published  acts  the  views  of  the  Second  Presbytery  are  well 
known,  there  is  no  occasion  for  such  consultation,  and  no  favourable 
results  could  follow  from  it.  The  ground  ot  complaint,  therefore,  is  a 
mere  quibble,  and  betrays  the  meagerness  of  the  cause  of  which  it  is 
a  part.  I  observe,  secondly,  that  if  the  Assembly  sustain  the  com- 
plaint on  that  ground,  it  is  hoped  for  their  own  sakes,  that  they 
will  be  consistent  with  themselves.  I  understand,  that  if  the  affi- 
nity  Presbytery  be  re-erected,  an  application  will  be  made  to  you, 
for  the  erection  of  an  affinity  Synod  for  its  especial  accommodation. 
Consistency,  as  well  as  common  justice,  will  require,  that  before  the 
request  be  granted,  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia  be  consulted  on  the 
subject.  We  shall  see,  Moderator,  and  the  world  shall  see,  whether 
you  are  disposed  to  dispense  even  handed  justice,  or  whether,  for 
party  purposes,  you  will  blow  hot  and  cold  with  the  same  breath.  Do 
not,  I  beseech  you.  Moderator,  expose  yourself  to  the  indignant  cen- 
sure of  the  community,  by  doing  for  a  spoiled  child,  a  favourite  of  your 
regards,  the  very  thing  for  which  you  are  about  to  condemn  the  Synod 
of  Philadelphia.  "  Consistency  is  a  jewel."  Do  not  give  to  the 
world  a  just  occasion  to  remark,  that  you  have  adopted  the  odious, 
Jesuitical  maxim — "  the  end  sanctifies  the  means."  Do  not  act  un- 
constitutionally for  the  sake  of  expediency,  as  you  have  been  exhorted 
to  do. 

It  has  been  affirmed  that  the  Synod  refused  to  divide  the  Presbytery 
of  Philadelphia  in  any  way.  This  is  true.  And  Mr.  Patterson  has 
stated  to  you  that  this  was  the  ground  of  complaint  in  1832.  Sir, 
when  the  doctrine  of  elective  affinity  was  of  doubtful  popularity,  the 
argument  for  division  was,  exteiit  of  territory  and  the  press  of  business. 
But  on  the  floor  of  Synod,  a  division  on  geographical  principles  was 
strenuously  opposed  by  those  who  argued  for  a  division  on  the  above 
grounds.  It  was  contended,  that  the  Assembly  had  recommended  a 
division  in  such  a  way  as  would  promote  peace.  But  the  Synod  were 
not  allowed  to  judge  of  what  mode  of  division  vvould  promote  peace 
within  its  own  bounds.  And  the  Assembly  must  be  called  in  to 
legislate  for  a  Synod,  with  whose  local  interests  and  peculiar  circum- 
stances the  great  majority  of  the  Assembly  were  perfectly  ignorant. 
And,  Sir,  did  they  effect  such  a  division  as  lessened  the  "  extent  of 
territory  ?"  Sir,  have  they  not  erected  a  Presbytery,  whose  limits, 
if  indeed  it  can  be  said  to  have  any  at  all,  are  co-extensive  with  those 
of  the  General  Assembly?  Sir,  it  is  a  new  General  Assembly,  a  new 
and  distinct  denomination,  that  you  have  erected  in  our  bosom.  And 
such  a  division  is  the  only  one  to  which  the  complainants  would  sub- 
mit. They  now  tell  you,  by  their  complaint,  that  they  will  have  no 
other.  They  dictate  to  you  as  to  the  course  you  are  to  pursue  in 
their  case.  And  if  you  refuse  to  listen  to  that  dictation,  you  are 
threatened  with  desertion.     They  say — 

"  If  the  whole  Presbyterian  Church,  represented  in   the  General 


33 

Assembly,  to  which  it  is  the  peculiar  privilege  of  the  humblest  indi- 
vidual in  any  one  of  our  Presbyterian  congregations  to  bring  his 
cause,  without  contumacy,  for  ultimate  decision,  shall  confirm  the 
doings  of  the  Synod  against  us,  we  shall,  like  good  Presbyterians, 
submit  to  its  decisions,  without  following  the  example  of  nullification 
which  has  been  set  us  by  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia,  or  shall  respect- 
fully withdraw  ourselves  from  that  extended,  honourable,  orthodox  and 
pious  denomination  of  Christians  to  which  we  now  belong." 

They  do  indeed  throw  out  this  threat  in  the  cautious  form  of  an 
alternative  to  submission.  But  if  "submission  to  the  Assembly, 
right  or  wrong,"  be  their  motto,  why  hint  at  a  withdrawal  from  your 
connection?  I  regard  this  insinuation,  Moderator,  as  bringing  in  an 
extraneous  influence,  calculated,  if  not  designed,  to  bias  improperly 
the  minds  of  this  court.  It  is  throwing  this  house  upon  a  balance, 
and  compelling  them  to  decide  between  the  propriety  of  sustaining 
the  Constitution,  and  the  expediency  of  a  measure  which  may  drive 
the  complainants  to  a  secession.  But,  Moderator,  you  need  never 
apprehend  a  secession  from  that  quarter.  The  orthodox  may  be 
driven,  by  ultra  measures,  to  a  secession.  They,  in  all  ages  of  the 
church,  have  been  the  seceders.  Errorists  never  secede,  when  they 
can  "  divide  and  conquer."  If  the  complainants,  and  those  who  sym- 
bolize with  them,  are  such  lovers  of  peace,  and  do  so  sincerely  desire 
it,  why  do  they  not  leave  us,  and  cease  to  be  the  occasion,  if  not  the 
cause,  of  strife  in  our  midst.  Let  them  leave  us,  and  the  sword  of 
internal  controversy  will  be  sheathed,  before  the  setting  of  to-mor- 
row's sun. 

Moderator,  the  Synod  of  Philadelphia  adopted  the  measure  now  com- 
plained of,  as  a  measure  of  peace.  It  was  sincerely  believed  by  its 
advocates  that  it  would  be  so  regarded  by  the  church  generally,  and 
that  it  would  satisfy  every  reasonable  and  pacific  mind  in  the  aflinity 
Presbytery.  It  was  dictated  by  no  party  feelings.  It  was  the  only 
alternative  to  a  continued  rejection  of  that  Presbytery.  Had  it  been 
a  party  measure,  you  would  have  found  a  very  different  array  of 
names  on  both  sides  of  the  question.  It  was,  indeed,  in  opposition 
to  the  principle  of  elective  aflSnity.  This  principle  the  Synod  do 
both  "  condemn  and  reprobate."  And  they  have  yet  not  learned  to 
act  on  the  principles  which  they  condemn  in  others.  Should  they 
become  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  ^^ improvement,^''  I  know  not  what 
they  might  do  hereafter.  The  Synod  could  not  sanction  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  Presbytery  in  their  bosom.  They  believed  it  to  be  not 
only  at  variance  with,  but  destructive  of,  the  Constitution.  You  are, 
nevertheless,  asked  to  continue  it.  You  are  asked  again  to  sanction 
and  act  upon  this  proscribed  principle.  Let  those  who  condemn 
this  principle,  and  who  will  yet  vote  to  sustain  this  Presbytery,  jus- 
tify their  consistency,  and  reconcile  their  conduct,  at  the  bar  of  pub- 
lic judgment,  of  conscience,  and  of  God. 

Should  you  again  erect  that  Presbytery,  and  leave  it  under  the 
control  of  Synod,  the  same  disposition  may  be  made  of  it  next  fall, 
as  that  now  complained  of.     The  Constitution  of  the  church  gives 


34 

to  Synod  this  right,  and  you  can  neither  destroy  nor  abridge  it. 
Besides,  you  will  in  that  case,  put  the  Third  Presbyterian  church  of 
this  city,  in  that  awkward  predicament,  in  which  it  was  placed  by 
the  wisdom  of  the  Assembly  of  1832.  The  different  sessions  em- 
braced in  the  New  Presbytery,  had  their  election  to  go  with  the  New 
or  remain  with  the  Old.  That  session  have  remained  in  connection 
with  the  Old.*  But  should  their  pastor,  Dr.  Ely,  vvho  belongs  to  the 
New  Presbytery,  wish  to  be  separated  from  his  present  pastoral 
charge,  which  Presbytery  would  be  competent  to  dissolve  the  pastoral 
relation?     Here  is  a  difficulty  v/hich  it  becomes  you  to  obviate. 

We  now  leave  the  case  with  God  and  this  court.  On  your  deci- 
sion much  depends.  On  you  devolves,  at  this  crisis,  a  fearful  respon- 
sibility. Act  in  the  fear  of  God,  and  in  view  of  the  judgment  day. 
For  the  effects  of  your  vote  in  this  case,  will,  1  doubt  not,  be  felt  by 
generations  yet  unborn. 

*  Dr.  Ely  contradicted  this  statement,  and  gave  an  explanation,  in  con- 
nection with  the  record  of  his  session  in  the  case.  But  it  can  be  proved  that 
not  one  member  of  his  session  (including  the  Doctor  himself,  up  to  the 
time  when  he  thought  it  politic  to  change  his  opinion)  understood  the  act 
of  session  read  by  him  in  the  Assembly,  in  the  sense  in  which  he  explained 
it.  The  proof,  apart  from  the  individual  opinion  of  each  member,  is  fur- 
nished by  a  subsequent  sessional  act,  viz:  the  appointment  of  one  of  their 
number  to  attend  the  meeting  of  the  Old  Presbytery.  And  if  this  appoint- 
ment be  not  recorded  in  the  session  book,  it  may  be  accounted  for,  by  the 
fact,  that  Dr.  Ely  is  both  Moderator  and  Clerk  of  session.  'BnX.z.  new  explana- 
tion is  now  given  of  the  record  of  session,  read  in  the  Assembly,  by  which 
it  is  made  to  speak  what  the  session,  as  then  constituted,  never  intended  it 
should  mean. 

While  preparing  this  speech  for  the  press,  I  addressed  a  very  respectful 
note  to  Dr.  Ely,  requesting  him  to  favour  me  with  a  copy  of  the  minute  of 
session  read  by  him  in  the  Assembly.  My  object  was,  to  see  if  I  had 
misrepresented  the  case,  and  if  so,  to  correct  it  in  the  printed  speech.  I 
received  the  following  reply — on  which  I  make  no  other  comment  than  this — 
that  whatever  charges  against  me  are  insinuated  in  the  note  I  indignantly 
repel  as  false  and  slanderous. 

»'  The  Rev.  Mr.  Winchester  is  respectfully  informed,  that  those  persons 
who  have  endeavoured  to  sow  dissension  in  the  Third  Presbyterian  Church 
in  Philadelphia,  will  have  the  opportunity  of  reading  the  record  of  session, 
for  which  he  has  inquired,  in  due  time, 

Ezra  Stiles  Ely. 
Philadelphia,  June  16,  1834." 


